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Abstract 
The main focus of this thesis was to learn about the individual investor and their view 
of dividends. It set out to investigate whether private investors regard dividends as 
important (to themselves personally or as a signal of the company's performance) and 
also how dividends impact upon a company's value. The subject group is one which has 
been neglected by previous finance research as very little is known about their 
demographics and investing practices. 
Five major areas of dividend research were examined. These were: do investors believe 
that dividends affect the value of the share, how they prefer to obtain their income from 
shares, the reasons for dividend increases and decreases, whether dividend changes 
(increases and decreases) occur for different reasons and whether an age clientele effect 
exists. Most of these problems have been investigated previously by other researchers, 
but few have used individual investors to analyse these areas. 
A survey of 280 private investors tested these questions and concluded that private 
investors believe that dividends do affect the value of a share, dividends were perceived 
to be a safer form of income (but capital gains is preferred), that dividend increases and 
decreases occur because of different reasons (mostly related to profitability or liquidity) 
and that an age clientele does exist. Most significantly, this analysis revealed that 
investors behave in a way best described by Lintner's view of dividend policy, as they: 
prefer higher dividends to lower dividends, believe dividends are a safer form of 
income and believe that dividends affect the value of a share. 
Introduction 
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Introduction 
Optimal Dividend Policy theory has been a topic of academic debate smce its 
development. According to Farrelly and Baker (1989, Pg 92) three main theories have 
been proposed to explain dividend policy and its effect on company valuation. These 
are; those who believe that dividends positively affect the value of a share (the 
rightists); those who believe that dividends have no relationship to the value of a share 
(the middle group) and those who believe that in certain circumstances, a higher 
dividend should decrease the value of a share (the leftists). 
A basic assumption behind each of these three theories is the concept of a rational, 
profit maximising investors. However, little research has focused on investor behaviour, 
especially private investors. Lease, Lewellen and Schlarbaum (1974) suggest that 
academics know very little about the individual shareholder. Since their research, little 
work has studied the attributes and attitudes of private shareholders' .1 Many studies 
have used simulation and indirect methods instead of observing investors to obtain 
information. Shefrin and Statman (1984 pg 278) state: 
Financial theory has tended to ignore the question of how individual investors 
actually behave, concentrating instead on how asset prices are determined. 
Although these two groups have analysed shareholder behaviour, they did not 
investigate individual shareholders' and optimal dividend policy. The series of articles 
co-authored by Lease, Lewellen and Schlarbaum analysed the demographics of 
American investors, and the clientele effect while Shefrin and Statman studied investor 
psychology. 
Current research still neglects private investors, as Warren, Stevens and McConkey 
(1990, Pg 74) comment that "little empirical research exists concerning individual 
1 Shefrin and Statman (1984) appear to contradict this, but even these researchers used the data obtained from Lease, 
Lewellen and Schlarbaum's survey. 
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investment behaviour". According to these authors, the available literature tends to be in 
the form of 11nonquantitative esscrys" based on the individual writers1 experiences (such 
as a sharebroker) with private investors. However, very few researchers analysed the 
"attitudes, opinions and activities 11 of individual investors and their investment 
decisions. 
The Research Question 
The most important goal of this thesis is to analyse a much neglected investing group, 
private investors. Currently, little information is available about this group, regarding 
their: 
• rationality, 
• investing preferences, 
• demographics, 
• attitudes towards dividend policy. 
Although this research does not investigate all these areas, it will help fill a gap in the 
current field of knowledge. 
The specific objective is to analyse these three proposed dividend theories and 
determine whether private investors1 behaviour in New Zealand is consistent with one 
these proposed theories. 
The research surveys New Zealand shareholders to determine their attitudes regarding 
dividend theory and company valuation. 
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Value of Thesis 
This thesis will be of value to dividend theory research as it investigates dividend 
policy using an approach not used before. To date, it has been assumed that 
shareholders are rational and follow these theories, however this remains unproven. 
By directly investigating shareholders' (rather than the indirect methods favoured by 
other researchers), this research examines their attitudes towards dividends and 
company valuation. If their opinions and responses are consistent with the proposed 
theories this will add to the evidence in favour of that theory. As Partington (1989) 
comments, such results are useful as they provide a basis for triangulation. However, if 
the results differ from these three theories, then it may be that previous research may be 
misspecified in some manner. 
Outline of Thesis 
The thesis is dividend into six main sections (four parts). 
The first section of this thesis reviews the literature available regarding current dividend 
policy research. It focuses on the three optimal dividend policies, the information 
signalling hypothesis and the clientele effect. 
The second section is very significant as it collates the literature available about private 
investors and what is known about them. This summarises the literature about investor 
rationality, private shareholders investing strategies, past attempts using private 
investors to analyse dividend theory, and the significance of private investors. 
The third section outlines the five main hypotheses that this thesis tests. It again 
summarises the available literature regarding dividend research, but focuses on how the 
attitudes of private investors may differ from other classes of investors, thus causing 
different results. 
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The fourth section details the literature and process of designing the survey which was 
sent out to a random group of New Zealand shareholders. It summarises the design of 
the survey, the shareholder selection procedures and conducts an investigation of non-
response bias. 
The fifth section summarises the results of the survey and compares the results to the 
hypotheses. It investigates whether the hypotheses are accepted or rejected. If they are 
rejected, it attempts to explain why this occurred. 
The final section is a summary of all the results collected. It summarises the results of 
the hypotheses which are tested, demographic information which has been collected, 
other information which has been discovered and the optimal dividend policy which the 
evidence gained appears to be most consistent with. 
Part I: 
Literature Review 
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Optimal Dividend Policy 
Academic views on optimal dividend policy follow one of three mam conceptual 
positions: the traditional view, 1 the "middle of the road 11 view, and the radical view. 2 
The traditional view contends that the dividend payout rate has a positive correlation to 
the price of the share. The "middle of the road" view argues that dividends are 
irrelevant and the "radical left" view argues that dividend policy should be designed to 
suit the tax regime. 
Traditional Rightists' 
The rightist group is considered a conservative group who contends that an increase in a 
dividend payout will increase a firm's value. According to Brealey and Myers (1991, Pg 
376), most traditional finance literature supports this assertion. 
Myron Gordon and John Lintner were two early proponents on this school. The main 
argument behind this theory is that dividends represent a safer form of income than 
capital gains, as they receive the income earlier3 and have the assurance of an income. 
Lintner, after his survey of American managers, summarised some of the important 
elements involved in setting dividends. Brealey and Myers (1991) summarise these into 
what they term ''four srylised facts". These are: 
1 Firms have long run target dividend payout ratios. 
2 Managers focus more on dividend changes than on absolute levels. 
3 Dividend changes follow shifts in long run, sustainable earnings and managers 
"smooth" dividends to maintain a pattern. 
1 Also known as the rightists. 
2 Also known as the leftists. 
3Rather than having to wait to sell the shares. 
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4 Managers are reluctant to make dividend changes that they may have to 
reverse. 
Miller and Modigliani referred to this argument as the 1bird in the hand fallaci because 
most investors reinvest their dividends back into shares. This makes the dividend 
unnecessary as investors rely on capital appreciation for their income. 
There has been extensive research into Lintnds assertions about optimal dividend 
policy. The most common form of research has been an attempt to replicate Lintnds 
survey of managers1 to determine their attitudes regarding dividend policy. Such 
examples are Alexander and Blanchard (1992), Baker and Farrelly (1988), 
Kerdemelidis and Juchau (1989) and Baker, Farrelly and Edelman (1985). 
The results from most of this research are consistent with Lintnds view of dividend 
policy. Baker and Farrelly (1988, Pg 84) found that the most important reason for 
paying dividends was to meet 11stockholders1 expectations for continued dividend growth 
and maintaining or increasing stock price 11 • This shows that continued dividend growth 
and the maintenance of the stock price may not be independent. Failure to maintain 
dividends could result in 11stockholder disappointment 1 and a drop in the companis 
share price. 
Another important piece of research corroborating Lintner1s theory was that of Farrelly 
and Baker1s (1989). These two surveyed security analysts and found their responses 
were similar to those of dividend policy makers. Institutional investors who responded 
to their survey felt dividends were important. This result was not surprising to these two 
researchers, as most corporations pay 11much attention to the continuity and consistency 
of dividends, presumably in order to hold the c01ifidence of stockholderi1• Research 
shows that attention to dividends is worthwhile, as investors perceive that dividend 
policy changes are correlated to share price changes. 
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One group of researchers, Jose and Stevens (1989, Pg 659) located a relationship 
between dividend policy and a firm's share price. According to their analysis, share 
price premiums were associated with stable and steadily growing dividends. This result 
was consistent with Lintner's 'four stylised facts'. 
However, proponents of the other schools use the share price reaction to dividend 
changes to argue their case. According to Marakyan and Carroll (1991, Pg 62) 
supporters of dividend relevance interpret the share price reaction to a dividend 
initiation as evidence that investors prefer higher dividends.4 
Two Australasian based studies produced mixed results regarding the applicability of 
the rightist school on dividend policy. Kerdemelidis and Juchau (1989, Pg 52) found 
that managers believed shareholders had an entitlement to a fair share of company's 
earnings through dividends. However, Alexander and Blanchard (1992, Pg 6) found 
contradictory results as New Zealand managers, unlike their American counterparts, did 
not place a high level of importance on stable dividends. Therefore, the role of a target 
payout ratio when setting dividends appears uncertain in New Zealand. 
One interesting and significant relationship of the traditional rightist school and dividend 
policy is its possible connection to information signalling theory. According to Healy 
and Palepu (1988, Pg 151) their results were consistent with Lintner's observation that 
"managers consider past, current and future earnings when making dividend policy 
decisions". Since managers consider future earnings when setting dividends, changes in 
dividend policy should signal changes in managements' expectations of future earnings. 
Although New Zealand managers reject Lintner's dividend theory, according to 
Alexander and Blanchard (1992, Pg 7), their views are favourable towards signalling 
theory. 
4 However, the opponents argue that the reason for the stock price change is the information content of the 
announcement. 
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Middle Group 
The dividend irrelevance theory is a "middle of the road' theory according to Brealey 
and Myers (1991). The developers of this theory, Merton Miller and Franco Modigliani 
argued that dividends are irrelevant, as they do not affect a firm's value or cost of 
capital. Therefore, there is no optimal dividend policy as one policy is as good as 
another. 
According to Miller and Modigliani (1961, Pg 425) this should be obvious, as a change 
in dividend policy implies "a change only in the distribution of the total return in any 
period as between dividends and capital gains. If investors behave rationally, such a 
change cannot a.fleet market valuations". Black (1976) states that this is the essence of 
the Miller and Modigliani theorem. Dividends do not affect the value of shares or 
investors' returns 11 because the higher the dividend, the less the investor receives in 
capital appreciation, no matter how the corporation's investments turn out". 
Miller and Modigliani reasoned that companies are valued by their earning power and 
risk class. Brigham and Gapenski (1991, Pg 529) summarise this view as they state that 
a firm's value depends on its "asset investment policy rather than on how earnings are 
split between dividends and retained earnings". This contradicts Lintner who argued 
that the disbursement of dividends to the shareholder has value. 
Miller and Modigliani developed their theory for a world without taxes or transaction 
costs. Brigham and Gapenski summarise the five assumptions under which the theory 
was developed. These assumptions are: 
1 No personal or corporate income taxes. 
2 No stock flotation or transaction costs. 
3 Dividend Policy has no effect on the firm's cost of equity. 
4 The firm's capital investment policy is independent of its dividend policy. 
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5 Investors and managers have the same set of information (symmetric 
information) regarding investment opportunities. 
Miller and Modigliani argue that this is what will occur given these assumptions and if 
investors act rationally and provide examples of where the theory may not apply. One 
example is the clientele effect, where investors gravitate towards a company because of 
its dividend policy. However, they commented that one clientele was as good as 
another. 
Another example is the information signalling hypothesis as dividends may signal 
management's intentions and beliefs about the future prospects of the company to 
investors. Miller (1989, Pg 104) argued that managers' decisions regarding dividends 
may provide signals to investors, but changing the dividend "would not affect the total 
return of cash plus appreciation". According to Brealey and Myers (1991, Pg 383), 
Miller and Modigliani regarded the informational content of dividends as temporary. 
From their observations, Miller and Modigliani (1961, Pg 428) noted that speculative 
bubbles did occur in the sharemarket and that these events received significant media 
coverage. However, these authors commented when these 'bubbles' occurred they are 
not a "dominant, or even a fundamental, feature of actual market behaviour under 
uncertainty". Therefore, in the long run the market would follow their postulates. 
According to Brealey and Myers (1991, Pg 377), most academics accept Miller and 
Modigliani's reasoning as correct.5 However, the debate about this theory's relevance is 
now over whether taxes or other market imperfections alter this theory's application. 
Brigham and Gapenski (1991, Pg 529) comment that the Miller and Modigliani 
assumptions "are not realistic, and they obviously do not hold precisely". Therefore 
their conclusions on dividend irrelevance may not be valid under real world conditions. 
5Given its strict assumptions. 
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Huberman (1990, Sl06) agrees in principle as he observes their "argument is suspicious 
in the presence of transaction costs". 
Brealey and Myers (1991, Pg 391) state that Miller and Modigliani's theory, like most 
other optimal dividend theories, is "too incomplete ... to warrant any dogmatism", but 
their sympathies lie with the middle of the road view. Although dividends are more 
predictable than capital gains, the important point is; so long as investment policy and 
borrowing remains constant, a firm's cash flow is the same regardless of payout policy. 
Also, shareholders' should be indifferent between the two forms of income, as they can 
sell a parcel of their shares to obtain what Shefrin and Statman (1984, Pg 253) termed a 
'homemade' cash dividend. 
However, one group who have uncovered empirical evidence consistent with Miller and 
Modigliani's propositions are Jose and Stevens (1989). Their analysis (which also 
supported Lintner's propositions) confirms the classic irrelevance theory to the extent 
"that the levels and trends of payout ratios are not associated with market value 
premiums". That is, higher dividend payouts trends that were not matched by high 
earnings did not cause a share to trade at a premium. The market valued firms by their 
earning capacity and not their payout policy. 
These researchers claim that the 'constant dividend's premium', as described by Lintner, 
can coexist with Miller and Modigliani's classic dividend irrelevance hypothesis. 
Radical Left 
According to Brealey and Myers (1991, Pg 377), the leftist group pushed Miller and 
Modigliani's argument of dividend irrelevance towards the 'centre'. The leftists' position 
takes its basis from Miller and Modigliani's argument, but modifies it to take account of 
taxes and transaction costs. Brealey and Myers state that the left wing dividend creed is 
simple: 
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Whenever dividends are taxed more heavily than capital gains, firms should 
pay the lowest cash dividend they can get away with. ;1vailable cash should be 
retained and reinvested or used to repurchase shares. 
Brigham and Gapenski (1991, Pg 532) state that Litzenberger and Ramaswamy are the 
main proponents of this school. Their position is normally perceived to be the reverse of 
Gordon and Lintner. This group argues for a tax and transaction cost based dividend 
policy, as a firm should set dividends in order to maximise shareholders' net results 
from their investing activities. Accordingly firms' should attract a clientele of investors 
whose tax brackets align to its own dividend policy. 6 
The idea of setting dividends according to the effective tax rates (on dividends and 
capital gains respectively) has been noted by many researchers. Black (1976, Pg 6) 
argued that with taxes, investors and corporations are no longer indifferent to the level 
of dividends. Pettit (1977, Pg 421) states that with market imperfections: 
the investor will select the optimal level of consumption and the optimal 
investment portfolio in view of the influence of these factors on net returns 
and the level of wealth. 
All things being constant, investors with dividend tax rates in excess of the capital gains 
tax rate should own shares with a relatively low dividend yield, and vice versa when the 
capital gains tax rate is higher than the dividend tax rate. 
The effect of transaction costs on optimal dividend policy has not received the same 
attention that the tax clientele effect has. Shefrin and Statman (1984, Pg 274) comment 
that transaction costs, such as brokerage commissions, can make it more efficient for 
investors to gain their income from dividends rather than sell shares and pay brokerage 
commissions. 
Most research in this area supports the idea that investors will align themselves with a 
company whose dividend policy suits their own tax bracket. Litzenberger and 
6 Miller and Modigliani hypothesised that shareholders would gravitate towards a firm whose dividend policy was to their 
personal satisfaction, and that one clientele is as good as another. 
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Ramaswamy (1979) found results compatible with the existence of a clientele effect. 
Pettit (1977) also found support for the existence of a dividend clientele effect which 
was partly due to the different rates of tax on dividends and capital gains. However, 
Baker, Farrelly and Edelman (1985, Pg 82) only found slight agreement that 
shareholders invest in firms with dividend policies appropriate to their tax environment. 
Although, in a later article, Baker (1989) argued that a perceived preference for capital 
gains, rather than dividends by shareholders, is due to the lower tax rates on capital 
gains than dividend income. 
Currently tax rates for dividends and capital gains are similar in most countries now 
(apart from New Zealand). As a result investors should be indifferent as to their income 
source if the gross returns achieved are the same. Alexander and Blanchard (1992, Pg 7) 
found that New Zealand financial managers rejected the notion that companies paying a 
low dividend attract shareholders in higher tax brackets, but stated this may be due to 
the dividend imputation system. 
Transaction costs may only have a limited effect on dividend policy. Black (1976, Pg 6) 
argues that if transaction costs are too high then corporations can arrange for automatic 
share repurchase plans to allow the investor to have a cash disbursement and therefore 
11 transaction costs don't tell us much about why corporations pay dividends 11 .1 
According to Shefrin and Statman (1984, Pg 274), transaction costs undoubtably play 
some role in the preference for dividends, however do 11not appear to provide a major 
(let alone complete) explanation of the phenomenon 11 • 
Mixed Support for the leftist view exists. The majority of research agrees that dividend 
clienteles do exist. However Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1982, Pg 443) question 
whether clienteles are attributable to taxes or 11some omitted variables 11 • 
?With the introduction of the new Companies Act in the middle of 1994, this will become applicable to New Zealand. 
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Information Signalling 
Modigliani and Miller were the first academics to hypothesise that dividends may 
convey information (see Watts 1973). The underlying principle of their argument was 
that dividend policy8 may convey information about managers' expectations of the 
future prospects of the company. This occurs, according to Baker and Haslem (1974, Pg 
1259), because investors "may realise that a firm's reported earnings are not 
necessarily representative of reasonable and valid estimates of its true earnings". 
Therefore investors may rely on some other form of information, such as dividends, to 
obtain a forecast of managements' intentions. 
Miller and Modigliani (1961, Pg 430) stated that when a firm has maintained a 
relatively stable dividend, then investors "are likely to (and have good reason to) 
interpret a change in the dividend rate as a change in management's views of future 
profit prospects for the.firm". The core of this argument, according to Miller (1987, Pg 
14), is that managers know more about the prospects of the firm (termed asymmetric 
information). 
To date, researchers are unsure of the actual information and price effects of dividend 
policy. However, what they do know, according to Ghosh and Woolridge (1988, Pg 
281) is that the valuation effect of a reduction in dividends frequently exceeds the effect 
of a comparable increase. Therefore "dividend cuts contain more information" than a 
dividend increase. They cite managerial reluctance to cut dividends to be the reason for 
this 
Most empirical research on the information signalling effect has either used aggregate 
market based studies to test for the market reaction of dividend changes, or has directly 
surveyed managers9 to ascertain their attitudes regarding information signalling. A third 
8Especially changes in the dividend. 
9Following Lintner's style. 
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methodology employed is to analyse the change in a company's earnings following a 
dividend change. 
Using a market based study, Asquith and Mullins (1983) found evidence which 
supports the view that "dividends convey to investors valuable information in addition 
to that contained in contemporaneous information sources". The benefits to investors of 
this information appeared to outweigh the costs associated with paying dividends. 
Another study analysing market data was conducted by Healy and Palepu (1989). They 
were able to locate a positive reaction to the announcement of dividend initiations 
showing that dividend changes provide signals to investors. 
Research that has applied the managerial survey technique reveals that managers do 
believe that dividends convey information. In one such study, Baker, Farrelly and 
Edelman (1985) found that U.S. managers' believed that dividend policy contained 
information about the future prospects of the company. Baker and Farrelly (1988) 
conducted a similar study and found that dividend changes provide signals to investors, 
and that this may effect share prices. According to these two authors', investors interpret 
dividend changes as signals "since most companies increase dividends only when there 
is a high degree of confidence that the new payout can be sustained'. However, they 
did note that firms are reluctant to decrease dividends "even when the outlook warrants 
it". 
Another methodology used to analyse the signalling phenomenon is to examine the 
changes occurring within a company's profitability after it unexpectedly changes 
dividends. Manakyan and Carroll (1990 and 1991) applied such a technique. They 
noted that the empirical evidence linking dividends changes to a firm's subsequent 
earnings performance is "sparse, and inconsistent at best". 
The purpose of their studies was to address the reliability of signals and to see whether 
dividend changes are followed by changes in earnings. The 1990 study showed that 
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dividend changes are followed by changes in earrungs m the following periods. 10 
Manakyan and Carroll found that both the direction and magnitude of the 'unexpected 
change' in dividends was consistent with the direction and magnitude of the 
unanticipated change in earnings.11 
In their 1991 analysis, these authors analysed the relationship between structural 
changes in earnings and dividend policy. Again this paper found that a relationship 
existed between dividend policy and future earnings, as a weak link between dividend 
signals and subsequent earnings performance existed. However, this relationship was 
only statistically significant for a third of the firms (and only occurred for some firms). 
In addition, these authors noted that changes in earnings structure were most apparent 
when unfavourable information is being conveyed. 
Two Australasian surveys have analysed managers' and obtained results consistent with 
the information signalling theory. Kerdemelidis and Juchau (1989) found that although 
New Zealand shareholders may be indifferent to their form of income, the information 
content of dividends is significant as it helps to "meet market expectations and to 
maintain confidence in the market". Alexander and Blanchard (1992, Pg 7) performed a 
similar study and found New Zealand managers' to be, "at best lukewarm" to the idea 
that dividends provided a signal of the firms future prospects. 
Two Australian authors, Hamson and Ziegler (1990, Pg 41) analysed the impact of the 
recently introduced dividend imputation system may have on dividend signalling 
theory. They observed that dividend imputation has no direct impact on dividend 
signalling, as a higher dividend payment should reflect management's confidence in the 
future profitability of the firm. These authors noted that there may be an indirect effect 
1 Dsubsequent two quarters. 
11 So a larger and more positive unanticipated change in dividends was associated with a larger and more positive 
increase in earnings. 
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on information signalling, as the availability of imputation credits may alter the level of 
dividends that a firm chooses to pay.12 
Few academics disagree with the proposition that a company's dividend policy can 
convey information. Of those who do, most of their research is theoretical in nature. In 
an early study, Watts (1973, Pg 211) concluded that "in general, the information 
content of dividends can only be trivial". According to this author the information 
which managers use in setting dividends is "lost in the noise in the dividend model". 
Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1982, Pg 443) who conducted a more empirical study1 3 
commented that the significant yields obtained on shares "cannot be pinned to the 
information content". 
One of the major advantages of dividend signalling, according to Black (1976), is that it 
may tell investors more about what managers' really think. If the managers' forecasts 
are reliable, then a firm's dividend policy should convey information. Brigham and 
Gapenski (1991, Pg 535) note that like most other aspects of dividend policy, empirical 
studies of signalling effects have been inconclusive, but it is evident that dividend 
announcements do convey information. However, it remains difficult to tell whether 
stock price changes following dividend changes reflect "only signalling effects or both 
signalling and dividend preference effects". 
12rhis is true in New Zealand, as companies attempt to maintain a policy of paying fully Imputed dividends. 
13 Although they were mainly analysing the clientele effect. 
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Clientele Effect 
According to Miller and Modigliani (1961, Pg 431) the clientele effect is an example 
how market imperfections (such as brokerage fees or taxes) could bias individual 
investors towards preferring a particular dividend policy. These imperfections are not 
sufficient for a certain dividend policy to "command a permanent premium in the 
market'. Each company attracts a 11 clientele11 of those preferring its particular dividend 
policy, but when valuing a company, the clientele effect is irrelevant.14 
However, according to Crockett and Friend (1988, Pg 603) a major puzzle in finance is 
why firms pay dividends instead of retaining the earnings or repurchasing shares. 15 The 
contrast occurring between the predictions of theory and observed behaviour "is so 
striking as to raise serious questions of investor I and or firm rationality". 
Since Miller and Modigliani established this argument, clientele research has analysed 
the effect that taxes, transaction costs and the individual investors' circumstances could 
have on influencing their choice of investment. Clientele effect research has not limited 
itself to analysing the tax induced clientele effect or age effect as suggested by Miller 
and Modigliani, but has also investigated financial leverage clienteles and other types of 
clienteles. 
Most research investigating the clientele effect has relied on surveys to obtain the data. 
A large proportion of these analysed individual investors to obtain information 
regarding their individual circumstances and investing policies. There is a form of bias 
in this research as the survey performed by Lease, Lewellen and Schlarbaum in mid 
1972 forms the majority of the data used to analyse the clientele effect. 
14 As the company's valuation is independent of its dividend policy. 
15 Due to the tax differential which favours capital gains 
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The results of these studies shows that age is the most notable factor causing a clientele 
effect as a significant relationship exists between an investor's age and investing pattern. 
In one of their many studies Lease, Lewellen and Schlarbaum (1976) found that as the 
age of the investor increased (from the youngest classification to the oldest), short term 
capital gains diminished in importance and dividend income becomes more important. 
Also, as the investor's age increased, they held more diversified portfolios and invested 
in lower risk opportunities. 
Crockett and Friend (1988, Pg 604) agree as they state that one investor subgroup 
(elderly) may rationally prefer dividends. This subgroup holds a rising share of the 
stock owned by individuals and are probably subject to relatively low taxes. They may 
prefer dividend income, and be considered rational investors (in the classical sense). 
Other studies have found similar results, Lewellen, Stanley, Lease and Schlarbaum 
(1978) found the most important characteristic when determining dividend preference 
to be the investor's age. A possible explanation for the higher concentration of older 
investors around high dividend stocks are transaction costs; as they would not have to 
sell stock (and incur the transaction cost) to obtain income. Pettit (1977) performed a 
similar analysis1 6 and gained similar results. His results indicated a significantly 
positive relationship between dividend yield and age. Age had a negative correlation to 
income and this corresponded to the increased dissaving of individuals as they got older 
(retirement). 
Clientele research has analysed many other individual characteristics of individual 
investors. However these characteristics did not receive such consistent results. Such 
examples are that Lewellen, Stanley, Lease and Schlarbaum (1978, Pg 1393) noted that 
female investors preferred high dividend yield stocks, and that the investor's 
16 Again using the same data as collected by Lease, Lewellen and Schlarbaum. 
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employment status17 correlated to their choice of investment. Cohn, Lewellen, Lease 
and Schlarbaum (1975, Pg 610) found married individual tended to invest less in risky 
assets than single individuals.1 8 
The tax induced clientele effect has been another area of interest in this research. It is 
one of the primary examples given by Miller and Modigliani as to why investors may 
prefer a certain dividend policy in the market.1 9 Litzenberger and Ramaswamy 
extended this argument to become one of the three conflicting optimal capital structure 
theories. They argued that firms should set their dividend policies according to the tax 
differential between capital gains and dividend income. 
In several articles (1979, 1980 and 1982), Litzenberger and Ramaswamy concluded that 
a tax induced clientele effect did exist. According to these authors, stockholders in 
higher tax brackets chose shares with low dividend yields, and vice versa. However, 
they commented that more research must occur before the implications of this theory 
are capable of being tested. 
One methodology used to analyse the tax clientele effect is to examine the specific price 
change occurring when a dividend change occurs. According to many researchers, the 
price of a share will drop by the amount of the dividend, less the marginal tax rate of 
that firm's clientele. As the dividend policy changes, the previous clientele will sell their 
shares and buy shares in a company whose dividend policy is more suitable for their tax 
brackets. Meanwhile, the new dividend policy should become attractive to a new class 
of investor. Therefore, the change in the price should reflect the marginal tax difference 
between these two clienteles. 
1? This category included whether the individual was employed, unemployed and retired. The employment category was 
further split into employment in a non profit or profit making firm. 
18 Other things being equal. 
19 With its imperfections such as taxes and transaction costs. 
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An early study to use this methodology was that of Elton and Gruber (1970, Pg 73). 
Their results showed that firms attract a clientele based on the taxation implications of 
each company's dividend policy. However, other researchers using this technique are 
unsure whether it is applicable. Kalay (1982, Pg 1068) comment that it is impossible to 
infer the marginal tax rates of investors from the relative price drop in a share's price at 
the time of a dividend change. Therefore, the documented ex-dividend day behaviour of 
stock prices is not necessarily evidence of a tax effect or a clientele effect. A further 
study having a similar conclusion was conducted by Gagnon and Suret (1991, Pg 255). 
These authors suggest that the variability in prices caused by a dividend change is so 
large that it is impossible to assess marginal tax rates or to detect dividend tax clientele 
effects 
Most other research analysing the tax induced clientele effect used survey data to obtain 
the information, and the results are somewhat contradictory. On one hand, Pettit (1977, 
Pg 432) found evidence supporting a dividend clientele effect which was "due to both 
relative desires for consumption and different rates of tax on dividends and capital 
gains". However, other research (some using the same data) found little evidence to 
support the existence of a tax induced clientele effect. According to Lewellen, Stanley, 
Lease and Schlarbaum (1978) they were unable to locate "much evidence to support the 
notion than an important dividend tax clientele effect is in fact present". Baker, Farrelly 
and Edelman (1985), in their survey of managers,20 found "slight agreement" that 
investors find dividend policies appropriate to their tax environment more attractive. 
Finally, Crockett and Friend (1988, Pg 603 - 604) state that the "available evidence 
indicates that tax clientele effects are surprisingly weak". 
Another area for analysis has been the tax induced leverage clienteles. According to 
Kim, Lewellen and McConnell ( 1979), an important implication from Miller's analysis 
is that individuals will sort themselves into tax induced financial leverage clienteles. 
20 Unlike the survey of private investors used by both Pettit and Lewellen, Stanley, Lease and Schlarbaum. 
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This occurs when individuals in low income tax brackets will hold shares in firms 
having highly levered capital structures and vice versa for individuals in high income 
tax brackets. However, they concluded that firms do not attract distinct groups of 
investors on the basis of their debt to capital ratios and that 'other factors' could 
outweigh the leverage clientele tendencies in the market. 
A final factor highlighting the existence of a clientele effect has been the introduction 
of the imputation credit regime. According to Wills (1991, Pg 36) the introduction of 
dividend imputation in Australia resulted in a "shift of shareholder preference awcry 
from profit retention to more generous dividend distributions". This author states that 
dividend imputation has created "different groups of shareholders" who prefer 
particular dividend and franking combinations. However, this effect may not be so 
apparent in New Zealand as there is no capital gains tax on share transactions21 22 and 
that shareholders who qualify for the pension have to pay a sur charge if their income 
reaches a certain level. 23 This may make these investors prefer to receive income from 
capital gains and may undermine the age clientele effect. 
Although, much of the research performed on clientele effects is very inclusive, there is 
sufficient evidence to suggest they exist. As Lease Lewellen and Schlarbaum (1976) 
comment, "investors do align themselves with particular investment philosophies and 
distinct market segments, and apparently that alignment is systematically related to 
their individual circumstances". The clientele effect having most empirical support is 
the age clientele effect, for as investors get older, they prefer income in the form of 
dividends. A possible explanation of this is the transaction costs involved with selling 
shares. Younger investors (termed "accumulators" by Miller and Modigliani) appear to 
be more growth orientated and prefer shares with a lower dividend and more growth 
21 Unless the individual has been identified by the l.R.D as a regular trader. 
22 Unlike Australia which introduced a Capital Gains tax in September 1985. 
23 This is significant as older people form a large proportion of individual Investors. 
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potential. However, as Miller and Modigliani (1961) commented, one clientele is as 
good as any other and the existence of a clientele does not imply that one dividend 
policy is better than any other. 
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Assumed Rationality 
Miller and Modigliani (1961, Pg 412) defined a rational investor as one who preferred 
more wealth to less and is indifferent to the form this income takes. In turn, each 
investor assumes that all other investors act this way, or as Miller and Modigliani 
(1961, Pg 427) term "imputes rationality to the market". This definition of rationality is 
underlined by the Von Neumann-Morgenstein Expected Utility Theorem. However, 
since the development of this theory others have begun to investigate the definition of 
rationality itself and its application to the financial markets. 
One of the most significant advances beyond the von Neumann-Morgenstein view of 
rationality was made by Tversky and Kahneman. These two researchers have made a 
significant contribution to investigating rationality. According to Arrow (1982, Pg 5), 
their most significant addition was the development of the 'over-reaction hypothesis'. 
This hypothesis predicts that individuals give new information more importance or 
significance 1 than older information. As Arrow states, there is a tendency to ignore both 
prior information2 and the quality of the present information. According to Arrow, a 
''plausible hypothesis" is that individuals may not recognise that surprises could occur 
in the future and that there is a tendency to underestimate uncertainties in the short 
term. 
DeBondt and Thaler (1985, 1987, 1990) investigated this phenomenon. They based 
their research on the idea that investors' are ''poor Bayesian decision makers" and 
overreact to unexpected and dramatic news events. Their results were consistent with 
the predictions of the over-reaction hypothesis as investors did over-react to current 
information. 
1 More significance than the information deserves. 
2As Arrow explains, Bayesians' would call these probabilities. 
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Their 1990 article extended the analysis of this phenomenon to financial analysts. 
According to these two authors, 'formal economic models' of financial markets assume 
that all agents in the market are rational. Economists recognise that some are irrational, 
but consider them irrelevant as there are enough rational traders to ensure a rational 
market. Despite this, DeBondt and Thaler concluded that analysts were "decidedly 
human". When they compared their patterns of behaviour in an experiment with 
undergraduates, they found that analysts 'over-reacted' in the same way that the students 
did. 
They concluded that researchers and practitioners should take the "behavioural 
explanations of anomalous financial market outcomes" seriously. As an illustration, 
they quoted practitioners' statements which commented that the cause of the October 
1987 share crash was investor over-reaction. DeBondt and Thaler argue that analysts 
should be included with those who 'over-reacted' as they are just as likely to overreact 
as an individual. 
Another study with similar results was conducted by Ghosh and Woolridge (1989). 
They analysed the effect of a dividend cut on a company's share price. Their results 
were consistent with the hypothesis that shareholders overreact to information (dividend 
cuts in this case), regardless of the reasons for the dividend cut. 
Another of Kahneman and Tversky's ideas was further developed by Shefrin and 
Statman (1984). These researchers investigated alternative explanations of investor 
rationality3 based upon prospect theory and self control theory. The key point from 
these two theories is that the ''perfect substitutes feature of capital gains and dividends" 
characterising finance research is not always appropriate. 
Kahneman and Tversky developed Prospect Theory in the late 1970's. One of the tenets 
of this theory is the idea of regret aversion. Evidence from their studies indicated that 
3 Viewed as irrational by finance theory. 
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the sale of stock caused regret for some people. 4 Therefore individuals who are averse 
to regret may prefer to fund consumption from dividends rather than capital gains. This 
means that dividends and capital are not perfect substitutes, even when accounting for 
tax effects and informational considerations. 
Shefrin and Statman (1984) based their self control on a form of clientele effect 
argument. This theory can explain why people in the saving stage5 of the life cycle hold 
portfolios with lower dividend yields than those held by people in the dissaving stage. 6 
The argument states that investors will use dividends for their consumption as a form of 
self control. Investors achieve this by selecting a company whose dividend payout ratio 
conforms to their desired consumption level. Self control enters as the investor's fund 
consumption from dividends and they will not have to use capital to fund their 
consumption. 
Ghosh and Woolridge (1988) conducted an empirical analysis of self control theory 
while investigating shareholder reactions to decreases in dividend payouts by firms. 
They argued that self control theory portrays the younger (saving) investor as "a myopic 
individual" who has a long term objective of sustained growth. At the same time, the 
older ( dissaving) investor is a "self indulging myopic doer" concerned with short term 
gains which can be to the detriment of long term goals. Their empirical analysis found 
no support for self control theory. 
Miller (1987, Pg 15) accepts that investor irrationality exists. He comments that it may 
be more apparent with private investors who, "unlike institutional and other large 
4 As the share price may rise after the sale, hence causing regret when the investor could have sold it later and made a 
higher profit. 
5 Assumed to be younger investors who are starting their careers and saving for retirement. 
6 Individuals who have retired and are dissaving, that is, financing their consumption partly out of their savings. 
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investors, do not rely heavily on professional portfolio advisers" .7 For these investors, 
stocks may be more than just the "abstract 'bundles of return' of our economic models". 
Most research on investor rationality shows that the assumed rationality of investors as 
defined by the von Neumann-Morgenstein axioms may be inappropriate. Since Lintner 
(1956), most empirical research uses the assumption that investors are rational 
maximisers. However recent studies show that investors do not act rationally all the 
time and may have good reasons not to. As Shefrin and Statman (Pg 278) comment; 
financial theory has tended to ignore the question of how individual investors behave 
but instead has concentrated on price determination. Nevertheless, research shows that 
investors do act irrationally, as they overreact to current information and may not be 
indifferent between capital gains and dividends as finance theory assumes that they 
should be. 
7 As Miller points out, most of these investors hold and manage a modest stock directly. 
Part I: Literature Review Private Investor Research 29 
Investment Methods 
During the late 1970's and early 1980's several researchers analysed the investing 
strategies and preferred information sources of individual investors. Specific areas 
investigated have been; the accounting information used in decision making, the 
investing strategies used by individual investors, portfolio design and the relative 
success of individuals compared to the market. 
Researchers investigating the preferred information sources of private investors have 
noticed a consistent theme. Investors (not surprisingly) prefer future orientated 
information. Baker and Haslem (1973) comment that a widely accepted axiom of 
investing is that investors base their decisions on expectations of future earnings. 
Therefore, providing them with reliable earnings forecasts will improve their investing 
decisions as it reduces their uncertainty. 
A number of studies investigating the usage of annual reports by shareholders have 
documented the preference for future orientated information. According to Hines 
(1981) examples of preferred information are: 
1 The expected future growth in earning per share, 
2 The company's economic outlook, 
3 Industry and economy information. 
Chenall and Juchau (1977) found similar results as investors prefer information about 
events and transactions expected to occur while historic factors have a low ranking. 
Several researchers have analysed the specific sources of information used (such as 
newspapers or annual reports) by individual investors. Most comment on how the 
information requirements of this group differs from other investing groups. Baker and 
Haslem (1973, Pg 68) noticed that individuals and analysts prefer different sources and 
types of information. According to Hines (1981 ), this is because professional investors 
are usually more aware of investment decision making progresses and this is reflected 
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in their information sources. Courtis (1982, Pg 55) also found empirical support for this 
assertion as his results indicated that the individual's level of education influenced the 
information8 used in decision making. 
Of the possible sources of financial information, material gained through the financial 
press is perhaps the most important for individual shareholders. Lease, Lewellen and 
Schlarbaum (1974) reported that investors' considered public messages in journals and 
newspapers to be the most important. This group had lower opinions of customised 
services such as councillors, research organisations and banks. Finally, private 
messages from management were considered important, but these were still secondary 
to public information. 
According to Hines (1981, Pg 48) there may be two reasons why individuals do not rely 
extensively on annual reports to gain their investing information. Firstly, less than 55 
per cent of a company's earnings is attributable to firm specific factors. Therefore 
investors' use the financial press as a source of information regarding 'external factors' 
which may effect the firm's profitability. Secondly, shareholders may anticipate the 
content of annual reports9 before the release of the annual report. Therefore, share 
prices have already impounded the information in annual reports before publication, so 
shareholders receive them too late to use in their decision making.1° 
Courtis (1982) confirms the low usage of annual reports finding that only a sixth of 
private shareholders conducts a detailed analysis of the annual report.11 However, 
81n this case, the sections of the annual report. 
9By other information sources which can be obtained earlier, such as newspaper reports, stockbrokers reports, trade 
journals and investment circulars. 
1 O This is true in New Zealand, as a summary of a company's annual report is sent to stockbrokers months before the 
annual report is sent to all shareholders. 
11 Detailed was defined as reading the report for more than thirty minutes. 
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twenty per cent of private shareholders virtually ignored the report and spent 
approximately five minutes reviewing it.1 2 
The investing strategies used by individual investors has received some attention from 
academics. The most influential technique used in analysing investments appears to be 
fundamental analysis. Lease, Lewellen and Schlarbaum (1974, Pg 424) found that 
nearly two-thirds of investors' relied on fundamental analysis while only a quarter of 
investors relied on professional advice and very few used technical analysis. In their 
survey of investment analysts, Arnold and Moizer (1984) confirmed that the primary 
assessment method used is fundamental analysis and that technical analysis was "a poor 
second'. 
Other idiosyncrasies about the investing strategies of individual investors have received 
attention from researchers. Some more noticeable examples are: 
• Lease, Lewellen and Schlarbaum (1974) found investors spent little time and money 
monitoring their investment activities compared to other classes of investors. 
• Shefrin and Statman (1985) noted, that when compared to other classes of investors, 
individuals are very resistant to sell shares at a loss. They have a higher propensity 
to wait for a hoped increase in share price to recover their losses. 
• Lakonishok and Maberly (1990, Pg 232 - 242) suggested that individual investors 
may be more active traders on a Monday. This is because individual investors will 
devote time to financial decisions during the weekend and hence will be relatively 
more active on a Monday. 
Although it is apparent that private shareholders own a smaller proportion of shares 
than institutions, 13 there is no readily available explanation for this. A common 
12 In his own opinion - glancing at the photographs. 
13 Discussed in more detail on the section investigating the significance of private shareholders. 
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proposition is that professional investors earn greater returns than individual investors. 
Therefore individual investors let professional investors manage their money. 
Schlarbaum, Lewellen and Lease (1978) investigated whether private investors were 
any less successful than professional investors. The findings of this study indicated that 
individual investors surveyed obtained returns ''commensurate to the amount of 
systematic risk they assumed'. Professional portfolio managers were no more successful 
in selecting securities than individual investors. This was also true in comparison to 
large traders with sizeable blocks of shares. Therefore, there is no apparent 
disadvantage for individual investors to manage their own portfolios. 
In a later study, Lewellen, Lease and Schlarbaum (1979) attempted to analyse the 
variables related to investment performance. The results they obtained were, in their 
own opinion, poor. The first attribute they looked at was the portfolio construction 
chosen by the investor. The results obtained were not unidirectional as the best and 
worst performers shared common attributes. The higher and lower performers tended to 
have centred their trading activities in a smaller number of securities, invested off the 
main stock exchanges (such as the ASE) and concentrated on securities with higher 
beta's. Whereas, those who chose shares with a high dividend yield achieved a 
respectable return and comprised the middle performers. 
An attempt to regress performance on demographics also obtained poor results, which 
was not considered surprising. The only visible link between performance and 
demographics was somewhat "counter-intuitive" as investor education and income were 
both negatively related to the performance of the investor. The lower income earners 
and those with less formal education fell within the top performance groupings in the 
analysis. 14 
14soth variables were univariate significant at the .05 level. 
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Another area analysed by this study was the varying successfulness of the possible 
investment strategies used by investors. Again the results were somewhat disappointing. 
The investment strategies (such as fundamental or technical analysis) used by investors 
had no significant advantages over each other. Also, investors who spent little time and 
money on analysing information to make security selection decisions, "seemed to 
realise profits at no higher rate than did their more parsimonious and studious 
colleagues". A somewhat perplexing conclusion is that nothing can help individual 
investors' gain an advantage over other investors1 5 
Lease, Lewellen and Schlarbaum (1974) analysed the portfolio design of individual 
shareholders. Most investors held well-diversified portfolios and had eliminated ninety 
per cent of the non systematic risk from their portfolios. Approximately 40% of their 
assets were invested in equities and the portfolios mainly emphasised long term capital 
gains. Dividends and intermediate gains were the next most popular type of share, and 
short term gains were the lowest priority. 
According to Lease, Lewellen and Schlarbaum (1974) the average investor 1s "an 
individual who is far from preoccupied with managing his portfolio", obtains most 
information from public sources, mostly uses fundamental analysis for investing and 
owns a diversified portfolio. However, this group could not find support for the 
argument that institutions produce investment results superior to individuals. Therefore, 
"explanations of the withdrawal of individual investors from the stock market", based on 
these findings, cannot be explained by institutions being able to produce superior 
results. 
As a final comment, Schlarbaum, Lewellen and Lease (1978, Pg 438-439) propose that 
a major reason for individuals to manage their own portfolio may be "the pleasure 
15unless (according to this study) they stopped their education and were in a lower income grouping. 
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derived from the activity itself'. The investors who responded to their survey stated that 
they enjoyed the responsibility of managing their own portfolio. 
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Using Private Investors to analyse the Theory 
Arnold and Moizer (1984) state that most dividend research uses market based studies 
which analyse the "aggregate market reaction" to an event in the market. A major 
drawback with these studies is that they "shed little light" on the decision making 
processes of those involved. However, if a researcher surveyed those involved, they 
may be able to get a better indication of the decision making process of those involved. 
To date, surveys have been used extensively to conduct research in finance. Particular 
groups which have been targeted by researchers have been company managers, 
financial analysts and private shareholders. The surveys of private investors have 
investigated many areas in finance, such as investor rationality, their perceptions of risk 
and return, and market efficiency and their preferences for dividends. 
Of the survey literature which has investigated dividend policy and its relation to 
company valuation, very few researchers used private shareholders in their research. 
One major study is available which used private investors to analyse dividend policy. 
Baker and Haslem (1974) found that when reviewing investor perceptions of shares, 
dividends explained the greatest variability in their views. The results indicated that 
investors1 differ widely in their opinions concerning the importance of dividends and 
that dividends may provide a signal of management1s judgements of future expectations 
as investors1 realise that reported earnings do not necessarily correlate to 11true11 
earrungs. 
Individual investors have also been used to investigate how the assumptions of finance 
theories, such as the Capital Asset Pricing Model, 16 hold up to testing. According to 
Chang and Most (1977), their study challenges one of the assumptions of these theories, 
namely homogeneous investors. They discovered contradictory expectations from an 
161n particular, that investors have homogeneous expectations regarding the returns on assets. 
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'apparently similar' survey between two different groups of investors.17 Their analysis 
found age, education, and occupation to be important characteristics linked to 
differences in expectations and indicated that this particular class of investors had 
heterogeneous expectations. 
In a later study Chang, Most and Brain (1983) analysed users of financial statements to 
accertain if they are a homogeneous group. The users of corporate annual reports were 
classified into 3 groups: individual investors, institutional investors, and financial 
analysts. The investigation revealed that individual investors were not homogeneous18 
and suggested further research to stratify this group. While institutional investors and 
financial analysts were found to be homogeneous, they concluded that the individual 
investor group was very diverse. 
Gooding (1975) found similar results as individual investors have more heterogenous 
perceptions than portfolio managers. This implied that share price changes could be 
more significant in a market dominated by professionals as their actions would be more 
homogeneous, unlike individual investors. It also suggests that private investors should 
be analysed separately from other types of investors. 
Several researchers have analysed individual investors' perception of the risk and return 
relationship with regards to the design of a portfolio. Most research supports the notion 
that investors compare risk and return when analysing an investment. Gooding (1975, 
Pg 1314) found investors' perceptions (regarding a stock) to be "highly related to risk 
and return measures". Markese and Perritt (1985, Pg 29) concluded that investors' 
understand systematic market risk and can make investment decisions based upon 
relative market risk. Of those investors that knew the Beta of their portfolio, the 
majority reported Beta values equal or greater than one. 
17 One based in Florida and the other based in New Zealand. 
181n regards to the others. 
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This survey suggests that individual investors are risk seekers as Markese and Perritt 
(Pg 31) found that individual investors' have a "relatively strong" preference for risk. 
The respondents preferred growth rather than income opportunities. The relationship of 
risk preferences to investment objectives is "rational and support(s) the investor 
behaviour assumptions underlying financial models". 
However other researchers, such as Cohn, Lewellen, Lease and Schlarbaum (1975), 
disagree. They state that investors' risk aversion has been an essential assumption 
underlying all capital market theories, reporting that this is consistent with the empirical 
data. 
Market efficiency is another area analysed using this methodology. No comprehensive 
analysis has been undertaken, the results indicate that shareholders view the market as 
being efficient, to an extent. Lease, Lewellen and Schlarbaum (1974, Pg 432) found 
results consistent with the random walk hypothesis, as the respondents perceived that 
short term stock prices are difficult to predict with any confidence. 
However, other studies find differing levels of market efficiency. Arnold and Moizer 
(1984, Pg 206) commented that the market "reacts quickly and in the right direction to 
new information and is hence efficient in that sense", but the price changes do not 
follow share valuation models recommended in the literature. Many analysts (the 
subject of their survey) were not using these models and investors employing the 
analysts may be missing opportunities to make gains or to avoid losses when new 
information becomes available. 
This particular methodology has provided evidence on a range of theoretical aspects for 
finance. It provides evidence that: firstly, investors are not homogeneous as has been 
assumed and secondly, appear to have a reasonable understanding of systematic risk 
and its relation to return. However, some analyses obtain mixed results, which is 
perhaps due to the differing expectations among investors. What is clearly obvious, is 
that little research has used private investors to analyse optimal dividend policy. 
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Role of Shareholder, Market Significance and Power 
The goal of this section is to collate the available evidence regarding the role that 
individual shareholders play in the share market; in terms of their trading activities and 
proportion of share ownership. Unfortunately, the research in this area is incomplete, as 
Bowman, Cliffe and Navissi (1992, pg 5) state; that while research has partitioned 
investors into classes, 11 there is very little work either theoretical or empirical that helps 
with identification of the price setting investors11 • 
What research is available, has investigated either the English or American market. 
However, according to Briston and Dobbins (1978, Pg 3) this information is not 
accurate due to the 11abysmal quality of published statistics11 available. To analyse the 
equity ownership structure in New Zealand, the trends and patterns occurring in these 
overseas markets are the only available source of evidence.1 9 
What is most evident from this research is the high level of institutional ownership of 
the securities market and most researchers note that this trend is increasing. Briston and 
Dobbins (1978, Pg 11) comment that the change in 11 ownership of securities from 
persons to institutions has been a feature of the UK securities markets for many 
years11 • Similar trends have occurred in the U.S.A. as noted by Brancato (1990, Pg 38) 
who observes that institutional investors have substantially increased their trading 
activity and their percentage ownership of American corporations in the last fifteen 
years 
While individual investors are becoming less active traders in the market, they are not 
leaving the market. As Lease, Lewellen and Schlarbaum (1974, Pg 413) state, there has 
been a withdrawal of the 11 individual capital supplier to a position of derivative rather 
than direct participation in the market11 • Blume and Friend (1978, Pg 5) reiterated this 
finding, commenting that 11 virtually all of this decrease in the proportion of individual 
19Although some New Zealand companies produce statistics regarding the types of owners and size of holdings, this is 
rare (especially regarding the types of owners, the size of holdings is statutory) and not indicative of the market. 
Part I: Literature Review Private Investor Research 39 
holdings occurred in direct holdings". Investors have channelled more funds into 
personal trusts and investment companies and this has taken on a greater importance 
than their private holdings. 
This trend has been summarised by Lease, Lewellen and Schlarbaum (1978, Pg 414) 
who state that institutions have displaced individual's as they administer the portfolio on 
the shareholder's behalf. Although, this may reflect that the individual may lack the 
skills to manage a portfolio, the available evidence does not support this. According to 
Schlarbaum, Lewellen and Lease (1978, Pg440) "nowhere in the evidence compiled, 
can much support be found for the argument that institutions are able to produce 
investment results superior" to individuals. Blume and Friend (1978, Pg 73) find 
evidence consistent with this as their data indicates that this is little difference in 
individual and institutional investment performance. Therefore, the trend of individual 
investors becoming indirect investors is not attributable to the relative performance of 
individuals compared to institutions. 
Of the research that has attempted to analyse the patterns in security ownership, the 
majority has targeted institutional investors while individual investors have received 
scant attention. Two English studies have analysed the ownership of equites (see table 
1.1). Briston and Dobbins (1978, Pg 116) found that "other investors" (which includes 
individuals) owned about 57% ofU.K. quoted equities in 1975. They predicted that this 
group's holding will continue to fall to about 50 % in 1980 and in between 31 % and 
16% in the year 2000. This trend appears to be occurring in England, as a later study by 
Dunham (1989, Pg 74) found that ownership by individuals has fallen from 58.7% in 
1963 to 18% in 1988 
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Table 1.1: Relative proportion of ownership of equities in E11gland 
Briston and Dunham 
Dobbins (1975) (1963) 
Class of Investor 
Other (Includes private) 57 
Private 
Institutional 43 
59 
28 
40 
Dunham 
(1988) 
18 
67 
Courtis (1982) analysed the usage of annual reports by private, shareholders. This 
Australian study found that private shareholders represent 82 per cent of the recipients 
of annual reports. Therefore, the author concluded that this group is important enough 
to warrant analysis. 
Research focusing on institutional ownership of equities is more detailed. The focus has 
again been on the English and American equity market, but the results between these 
two are not similar. The research indicates that the proportion of direct institutional 
investment is lower in America than it is in England. Briston and Dobbins (1978, Pg 3) 
predict that institutional shareholders will own 84% of all quoted equities in the UK. in 
the year 2000. A later study by Dunham (1989, Pg 74) provides evidence to support this 
as he finds that the proportion of UK. equities owned by institutions has grown from 
27.8% in 1963 to approximately 67% in 1988. 
The American research shows that institutions only own about 45% of the listed equity. 
A report in Director and Boards (1990, Pg 58) showed that institutions owned $1.3 
trillion in corporate equities (41 per cent) in the U.S. at the end of 1988. Two other 
researchers have found results similar to this. Potter (1992, Pg 149) found that 
institutional investors owned 45.5% of the equity in 1985. Brancato (1990, Pg 38) 
estimates that institutional shareholders in 1988 11represented approximately 45 per cent 
of all equities11 • Although there is a difference between the figures report in Directors 
and Boards, and Brancato, it is apparent that during the late 19801s, institutions owned 
45% of the stock in the U.S.A. 
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Table 1.2: Relative proportion of ownership of equities in America 
Directors and Potter 
Boards (1988) (1985) 
Class of Investor 
Other (Includes Private) 59 
Institutional 41 
54.5 
45.5 
Brancato 
(1988) 
55 
45 
Although institutions do not dominate the market in terms of ownership, it appears that 
they are much more active traders than private investors. Lease, Lewellen and 
Schlarbaum (1974 Pg 413 - 414) state that since 1950 there has been ''a clear reversal· 
of the relative roles of the individual and the institution in allocating ownership funds 
among competing enterprises". Institutions have become much more active traders as 
their volume of trading exceeds their relative proportion of equity ownership. 
According to Briston and Dobbins (1978, Pg 51) this occurs in the U.K. as the "overall 
effect is that combined institutions contributed more to total turnover than their 
proportional ownership of U.K quoted equities", and other shareholders had 
contributed less. 
This trend still continues today as Mahoney (1991, Pg 54) comments that while 
institutions in America account for about two thirds of daily trading, individual 
investors still hold some 55% of the common stock of U.S. companies. Lakonishok, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1992, Pg 24) find similar results as they report that in 1989, 
institutional investors held about 50% of the equities in the United States, but their 
trading constituted 70% of the trading volume. 
The type of companies which individual and institutional investors prefer invest in is 
another area which has been investigated. It is apparent that there are significant 
differences in the type of company that individuals and institutional investors prefer to 
invest in. According to Blume and Friend (1978, Pg 5) "institutions and individuals 
tend to concentrate their holdings in different types of stocks". American institutions 
mostly invested in the largest 500 NYSE stocks, and largely ignore the over the counter 
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(OTC) stocks. However, individuals are almost a "mirror image" as they are the main 
investors in OTC and smaller listed stocks. 
This occurs to be the case for a variety of reasons. According to Mahoney (1991, Pg 
54) individuals make up the market for small companies, not by preference, but because 
the amount of shares available is not enough to attract large institutions. Secondly, 
small companies' shares are usually not so high priced and individual investors find 
these more attractive. Baker and Gallagher (1980, Pg 74) provide evidence which is 
consistent with this as they comment that if a firm reduces its share price (through a 
mechanism similar to a share split), this makes it more appealing to small investors.20 
They link this to the notion that high priced stocks are not as popular with individual 
investors and have a limited market available to them21 
Brancato (1990, Pg 38) analysed the concentration of ownership (mainly by 
institutions) in certain industries. This researcher found that some industries have a 
higher concentration of ownership by institutions than others.22 In 1988, aerospace, 
paper, and transportation industries had the highest level of institutional ownership (58 
per cent), while utilities and telecommunications had the lowest (35 per cent). 
Therefore, individual investors and institutional investors prefer to invest in different 
size firms and certain industries. 
Another area for analysis has been the impact that institutions have on market activity 
and trading. Researchers have been trying to determine whether institutions are price 
setters, if they follow the market, and if their trading has an impact on the market. The 
vast majority of this research is American and the results are inconsistent. An earlier 
study analysing this was conducted by Briston and Dobbins (1978, Pg 6). These two 
20A recent example of this in New Zealand is when Tasman Agriculture decided to conduct a share split. The directors 
stated that a "share split will facilitate a wider shareholder distribution". Pg 2, Tasman Agriculture Ltd., Announcement 
to the New Zealand Stock Exchange, Oct 12 1993. 
21 Namely institutional investors. 
22Therefore, it would be assumed that private shareholders would target other types of industries. 
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concluded that institutions either follow or make the market and that they do not "push 
share prices aw~ from index extremes". 
Further research has occurred, but the results between the various pieces of research are 
inconsistent with each other. Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny, (1992) found results 
similar to that of Briston and Dobbins. They suggest that institutional investors have a 
wide range of trading styles, such that they offset each other to a large extent. They 
concluded that there is "no solid evidence in our data that institutional investors 
destabilise prices of individual stocks". Instead, institutions follow such a broad range 
of styles and strategies, that their trading offsets "each other without having a large 
impact on prices". 
Two other researchers who analysed this area achieved totally contradictory results. 
According to Dunham (1989, Pg 75) since private shareholders have become less 
important in trading, it is harder to find investors to take a contrary view to the 
institutions. This author believes this accentuates the "gyrations" in the market, so that 
"everyone is either bullish or bearish". Potter (1992, Pg 154) argues that a 
concentration of institutional investors will result in fewer (and larger) trades so that the 
large trades will affect security prices. Therefore imperfect competition "m~ be more 
prevalent in securities owned by institutions". 
The trend of high levels of domination by institutions looks set to remain, as Dunham 
(1989, Pg 74) reports that many private investors suffered financial losses from the 
October 1987 crash, and have not returned to the market in force. This author predicts 
that in "the foreseeable future, institutional ownership is likely to remain high". 
However, more recently there have been reports that private investors are trading more 
actively. Shell (1992, Pg 7) reports that small investor activity on the New York Stock 
Dividend Policy and Private Shareholders 44 
Exchange was up 18% on the first nine months of 1991. More recently in New Zealand, 
there are signs that individual traders are returning to the market. 23 
It appears that private investors play a limited role in share market trading. Lease, 
Lewellen and Schlarbaum (1974, Pg 432) found that private investors were not naive 
about their role and trading position in the market. However, Blume and Friend (1978, 
Pg 5) point out that private shareholders are much more important in stock-ownership 
than in trading. While institutions are the most frequent traders (in relation to the 
proportion of stocks that they own) private shareholders do constitute a large proportion 
of the owners of securities. This finding appears to be applicable to New Zealand, and 
therefore individual shareholders are not an insignificant group. 
23As reported on National Radio (from the National Business Review). 
Part II: 
Hypothesis to Be Tested 
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Hypothesis 1: Individual Investors believe that dividends affect the value 
of the share. 
This hypothesis tests whether private shareholders believe that dividends affect the 
value of a share. If this is proven correct, it will: 
• help disprove Miller and Modigliani's theorem that share values are independent of 
a firm's dividend policy, 
• Provide evidence in favour of Lintner's traditional argument, 
• Provide limited evidence of the tax clientele argument. 
This section has two parts. The first directly analyses the question; 'do dividends affect 
the value of a share'. The second analyses the influence that dividends have on the value 
of a share. 
Section 1 
Question i) seeks to ascertain whether shareholders believe that dividends affect the 
value of a share.1 
There is significant empirical support for the proposition that dividends do affect the 
value of a share. This follows the theory of the traditional rightists who favour this 
supposition.2 This question format has been used on groups such as company managers 
and security analysts, but not individual shareholders. Farrelly and Baker (1989, Pg 99) 
found that institutional investors believe that stock price changes could be attributed to 
changes in dividend policy. In an earlier study of managers, Baker and Farrelly (1988, 
Pg 84) found that one of the most important reasons for paying dividends was to 
maintain or increase the company's stock price. 
1 A copy of the questionnaire is contained in the appendices. 
2For a more complete synopsis of the empirical evidence which supports this proposition, refer to the section on Optimal 
Dividend Policy. 
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Other studies analysing aggregate market data have reached a similar conclusion. Jose 
and Stevens (1989, Pg 658) found that both the trend and stability of a companis 
dividends had a significant long run impact on the value of the firm. Shiller (1990, Pg 
58) concluded that real stock prices follow the trend of real dividends. 
This question should receive strong agreement, as the vast majority of research 
available today can locate some correlation between dividends and the share price of a 
company. 
Section 2: 
The second section seeks to investigate how much influence dividends have over the 
value of a share. The survey participants receive a list of paired comparisons to see 
which one3 has more influence4 over the price they would pay for a share. 
The empirical evidence available on this topic is incomplete and very inconsistent at 
best. Therefore this section is very exploratory in nature. Another problem is that the 
question design may not elicit the desired responses as there is little previous work 
available for guidance. 
The five factors being investigated are: 
a) The PIE Ratio, 
b) The Earnings Per Share (a proxy for earnings), 
c) Company Risk, 
d) Imputation Credits, 
e) Dividends, 
31/\/hen they are evaluating shares. 
4or has a similar influence over the value of a share. 
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These factors were chosen as they are firm specific factDrs which the literature has 
shown have some correlation to the value of a share. 
Literature Summary: Importance of factors in share valuation. 
Price I Earnings Ratio (P/E) 
Although this ratio incorporates the share pnce of a company in its calculation, 
practitioners use it to analyse how overvalued or undervalued a company is (based on 
its earnings) compared to others. Therefore it is a very important factor used for 
analysing shares. 
There is considerable empirical support for the use of the PIE ratio in evaluating stocks. 
Pari, Carvell and Sullivan (1989, Pg 60) comment that as security valuation techniques 
become more sophisticated (and despite the availability of new methodologies) the 
"price/earnings (PIE) approach to security valuation has maintained its popularity 
among practicing security analysts". Another study, conducted by Hickman and Petry 
(1990, Pg 81) compared dividend based valuation models to the PIE technique. When 
used for valuing companies, the discounted dividend approach produces errors 
approximately 3 to 4 times as large as the PIE methods. 
Another researcher who analysed the use of the PIE ratio was Peters (1991). This author 
commented that the PIE analysis is a "widely used tool" in determining the relative 
valuation of stocks. However, this methodology has several disadvantageous, as it is 
only useful when analysing homogeneous stocks (such as in a particular industry). This 
author also notes that this ratio is more applicable for 'mature companies', as this 
technique has its limitations when used for growth stocks. 
The PIE ratio is important when evaluating shares, as its primary usage is comparing 
similar firms based on their earnings and share price importance. Therefore it should 
receive a high rating from the respondents. 
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Earnings Per Share 
According to Miller and Modigliani, the market valuation for shares is derived from the 
perceived stream of future earnings. Therefore, the current earning's figure and trends 
of previous earnings should give an indication of the company's future earnings. 
There is significant evidence available indicating that a primary factor behind the value 
of a share is the company's earnings. A study by Campbell (1990, Pg 47) attributed 
77% of the variance in unexpected stock returns to news about future earnings 
(dividends explain 13% of the variance). Another group, Constand, Freitas and Sullivan 
(1991, Pg 78) analysed the valuation of Japanese shares and found that the 'dramatic 
increase' in the market values of shares was attributable to an increase in company 
earnings. A third researcher, Peavy III (1992, Pg 10) shows that changes in company 
earnings and interest rate factors explains "approximately 58% of the variance of 
annual stock market returns from 1953 to 1987". 
Therefore, company earnings is another important factor used in the valuation of shares. 
Therefore, like the PIE ratio, earnings should receive a high ranking from the 
respondents. 
Company Risk 
The risk involved with investing in a company5 has been an important factor involved 
with valuing companies. The classic example of this is the risk premium involved in the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model, where calculating the company's risk premium entails 
multiplying the individual company's beta by the market risk premium. 
There is significant empirical support available indicating that risk influences the value 
of a share. A study by Shukla and Trzcinka (1991, Pg 15) found that measures of risk 
explained up to 40% of the variation in returns across stocks. Another study by Good 
5That is, its beta (or other indicator of risk, such as the chance it will cease trading). 
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(1989, Pg 7) found that swings in investor confidence (related to the risk premium) has, 
at times, overwhelmed the significance of earnings and dividends when valuing shares. 
In their analysis of the Japanese sharemarket Constand, Freitas and Sullivan (1991, Pg 
78) found that risk had a significant relationship to the market value of Japanese firms. 
This factor should be important in the valuation of shares. At best, it appears that it can 
only be equal in importance to variables such as earnings and the level of dividends (as 
it is used in conjunction with these variables), or behind them when evaluating a 
company. 
Imputation Credits 
Although imputation credits are relatively new to New Zealand, Bowman, Cliffe and 
Navissi (1992, Pg 2) suggest that their introduction "may have significantly modified 
many previously accepted prescriptions for financial asset allocation and corporate 
financial management practices". The disparity in treatment (of dividend income for 
taxation purposes) caused by the introduction of dividend imputation6 has significant 
implications for dividend policy and company valuation. Therefore, imputation credit 
availability (by companies) and their usage should be very important factors in 
company valuation. 
However, overseas research, particularly that done in Australia, shows that investors 
have not taken full advantage of the imputation system. Hamson and Ziegler (1990, Pg 
51) state that certain classes of investors have not made full use of imputed tax credits 
and this has resulted in Australia's dividend imputation system being very much 
taxpayer specific. More recently, investors' and companies have attempted to overcome 
this problem. 
6such as between tax free groups and foreign investors. 
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Other researchers agree that the preference for imputation credits has become very 
taxpayer specific. Wills (1991, Pg 36) reports that dividend imputation has created 
different groups or classes of shareholders with different preferences for particular 
dividend and franking combinations. 
The results for this factor should be mixed as the response will mainly depend of the 
specific individual answering. If the individual prefers capital gains income, then the 
availability of imputation credits will not be a high priority factor compared to those 
who rely on dividends for their income. The difference between these individuals 
should nullify the influence that imputation credits have and leave it as the lowest 
ranking factor. 
Dividends 
The use of dividends in valuing shares is a long established methodology in finance. 
The Gordon Growth Model codifies this as it uses discounted cashflows provided by 
dividends to calculate the value of a share. There is also significant evidence available 
showing that dividend policy has some relationship to the value of companies. Jose and 
Stevens (1989, Pg 659) found that stable dividend yields have a strong association with 
higher share valuations. According to Baker and Haslem (1974, Pg 1259), the factor 
explaining the greatest variability in share valuation was dividends. Dividends may 
even be a better predictor of the real earnings7 than a company's own reported earnings. 
In another study Shiller (1990, Pg 58) found that real stock prices just followed real 
dividend changes. According to this author, "it would seem that we know that dividends 
are the ultimate source of most stock price movements". Although the correlation 
between share price and dividend was "a low-frequency one" as dividends exhibit long 
run trends which share prices follow. Although, the author noted that in the shorter 
term, the correlation between price and dividend is much lower. 
7via the signalling hypothesis. 
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Two studies have directly compared the relative ability of dividends and earnings to 
predict share prices. One study by Hickman and Petry (1990, Pg 81) found that when 
using a PIE based model and a discounted dividend formula to calculate the value of a 
share, the dividend discount model produced errors 3 to 4 times as large as the PIE 
model. Another study analysed the proportion of variance in stock returns that an 
earning's proxy and a dividend proxy could explain. Campbell (1990, Pg 47) attributed 
77% of the variance in stock returns to information about future earnings while 
dividends only explained 13% of the variance. 
Dividends will not be as important as other factors when evaluating shares, especially in 
regards of the factors being analysed in this investigation. Research shows that 
dividends do not have a very strong influence over the price of a share. 
Conclusion 
The ranking's expected from these five factors are: 
• The Price Earnings (PIE) ratio will probably be the most consistently important 
factor. Given that earnings are an important valuation indicator, the PIE ratio will allow 
investors to determine whether the share is overvalued or undervalued. 
• Earnings should rank second. This should fall subordinate to the PIE ratio8 but 
will rank ahead of both imputation credits and dividends, and to be slightly ahead (or 
equal) to risk. 
• Risk will be the third most important factor, as it has been shown to be more 
influential than dividends or imputation credits. 
• Dividends will rank ahead of imputation credits, for two reasons. The first is 
that a firm must have a dividend policy which appeals to the shareholder in the first 
8As it contains more information than the earnings alone. 
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place.9 The second reason is that imputation credits appear to be very shareholder 
specific and this may dilute the ranking of imputation credits. 
• Finally Imputation credits, for the reasons outlined above would be the lowest 
ranked factor. 
This second section will not help answer the hypothesis being tested, for if the results 
occur as hypothesised, it will show that dividends are relatively unimportant when 
valuing shares (in relation to these other variables). 
9As it must be paying a dividend to have imputations attached. 
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Hypothesis 2: Private investors prefer dividend income to possible 
income from capital gains. 
This hypothesis tests whether private investors prefer income from dividends, rather 
than income made from selling shares. To investigate this, the survey employed 
question ii) and iii). 
Question ii) attempts to ascertain whether individuals prefer income from dividends to 
capital gains. 
This question investigates optimal dividend policy directly.1° The three main 
arguments, in brief are: the rightists claim that investor's prefer to receive income in the 
form of dividends, as it is a less risky form of income (determined by question iii) and a 
more certain form of cash flow. The middle group argues that investor will be 
indifferent between dividends and capital gains as they are perfect substitutes. 11 The 
final school argues that companies should set their disbursement policy according to the 
tax regime operating at the time. If the tax rate for dividends is higher than the tax rate 
for capital gains then investors should prefer to receive their income in the form of 
capital gains rather than dividends, and vice versa. 
Survey respondents should disagree with question ii) and prefer dividend income for a 
variety of reasons: 
a) Since individual investors' are being investigated and not institutions12 the 
respondents (private investors) may not view dividends and capital gains as substitutes. 
Evidence for this argument comes from Shefrin and Statman (1984). The main point of 
their article is that: 
10rhe literature review contains a more comprehensive review of the conflicting views of the three main schools. 
11 For to be substitutes they must be seen as having the same risk. 
12Although this argument can be extended to institutions. 
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The perfect substitutes feature of capital gains and dividends (in the 
absence of taxes and transaction costs) which characterises the standard 
approach is not always appropriate. 
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They provide evidence as to why an individual may prefer income in the form of 
dividends rather than capital gains. The chapter investigating investor rationality has a 
more detailed summary of this. 
b) A second argument as to why investors should prefer dividend income is a 
transaction cost based argument. According to Shefrin and Statman (1984, Pg 271), the 
existence of transaction costs makes "it more efficient for people who consume from 
their portfolios to consume from dividends rather than sell shares and pay brokerage 
commissions". Scholz (1992, Pg 264) supports this as he states that transaction costs 
changes the Miller and Modigliani irrelevance position. Therefore, to convert shares 
into cash, an investor has to pay brokerage fees and this author comments that for 
smaller sales "these fees can be a significant percentage of the total sale as they often 
contain a fixed component" .1 3 Given that most shareholders have relatively small 
holdings, the effect of transaction costs may have some influence over their income 
preference. 
c) The final argument relates to taxation. In rational terms, an individual trader should 
prefer to receive income in the form of capital gains as there normally will be no 
taxation paid on this income. 14 However, since the introduction of the imputation 
credits, individual investors should have a strong preference for shares carrying full 
imputation credits. Given that a large number of companies in New Zealand pay fully 
imputed dividends, this will increase the shareholders gross return and give them a 
rational reason to be indifferent between income from dividends and capital gajns.1 5 
131n Christchurch, these fees consist of an approximate $30 - $50 fixed charge and a minimum base rate of 1.5%. 
14Unless the individual has been identified as a regular trader by the l.R.D. 
15 For shareholders in lower tax brackets, imputation credits can significantly decrease the tax payable for a taxpayer, as 
imputation credits are calculated at the maximum tax bracket. However, this reasoning does not apply to those 
individuals receiving the pension. 
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Therefore since shareholders are not truly rational profit maXlilltsers, they should 
disagree with this statement. If Miller and Modigliani's argument is correct, they should 
be indifferent between the two income forms, and if the tax based theory is correct, they 
will agree with the statement.1 6 
Question iii) attempts to determine whether individual investors believe that dividends 
are a safer form of income than capital gains. 
Lintner (1956) proposed that dividends represent a safer form of income than capital 
gains. This is because investors do not have to wait to receive the income17 (an idea 
recently supported by Scholz 1992) and that the investor has the assurance of an 
income, as the capital gains may never occur. 
Investors should support this argument and will agree (on average) with the statement 
in question iii) 
Although the NZSE indicators were increasing at the time of the survey's first mailing, 
investors should reject Miller and Modigliani's proposition that dividends and capital 
gains are perfect substitutes. 18 According to Dunham (1989, Pg 74), the October (1987) 
share crash made many individual investors leave the sharemarket. Therefore, investors 
still may regard a share investment as risky. 
Therefore individual investors should see dividends as a safer form of income than 
capital gains. As Scholz states (1992, Pg 264) "dividends have the advantage of being 
regular and immediately liquid" and there is an element of risk in a possible capital gain 
occurnng. 
16 As there still is a preference for capital gains as not all shares dividend's are fully imputed and pensioners will prefer 
capital gains as they pay no tax at all on the income. 
17 As dividends are regular. 
1 S For if they are perfect substitutes, one cannot be seen as being more risky than the other. 
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The responses should support this hypothesis as the available evidence should show that 
individual shareholders prefer dividend income to possible capital gains (and that 
dividends are a safer form of income). 
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Hypothesis 3: Private Investors believe that an increase in dividends 
signals an expected increase in company profits. 
This hypothesis states that individual investors believe that when a company increases 
its dividend, it is because management believes its future profits will increase. Section 2 
(questions iv) to question viii)) is designed to investigate this hypothesis. 
If this hypothesis is correct, question iv) will have significantly more support than all 
other questions, as it asks whether the respondents believe that future profit increases 
will cause dividends to increase. 
Most variables analysed in this section came from Partington (1989). In this analysis he 
identified a variety of issues related to changes (including decreases) in dividend policy. 
These factors included: profitability, liquidity, cash flow variables and investment 
variables. 
This section analyses these four variables and includes a clientele based question 
(number viii)) and a question to test whether the respondents believe that a change in 
dividend policy is an attempt to fool investors and increase the share price. 
Question iv) attempts to ascertain whether individual investors believe that an expected 
increase in profits is the major reason for a dividend increase. 
This proposition has significant empirical support. 19 Evidence m favour of this 
proposition includes: 
• Healy and Palepu (1989) concluded that managers consider past, present and future 
earnings when setting dividends. 
• Baker, Farrelly and Edelman (1985) concluded that dividends provide signals about 
the future prosects of a company. 
19 Outlined in detail in the literature review. 
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• Miller (1987) stated that asymmetric information means that dividend changes can 
provide signals about the firm's future prosects. 
• Partington (1989, Pg 171) stated that profits were the "most important determinant 
of the size of dividend payments". 
• Manakyan and Carroll (1990, Pg 206 - 207) concluded that earnings are the main 
determinant of dividends and that dividends lag earnings. 
However, research performed in New Zealand, according to Alexander and Blanchard 
(1992), provides only lukewarm support for the signalling hypothesis. Furthermore, 
individual investors have not been the target for this type of research before, therefore 
this question is exploratory in nature. 
Although this research can be considered exploratory, it is expected that individual 
investors will agree with the hypothesis that an expected increase in profits can cause a 
dividend increase. 
Question v) attempts to determine whether individual investors believe that a cash 
surplus in a company can cause a dividend increase. 
Most literature regarding the signalling hypothesis has investigated the relationship 
between profits and dividends, however other factors must influence a firm's dividend 
policy. Partington (1989, Pg 169) states that the liquidity of the company is an 
important factor, as it affects the ability of the firm to pay dividends. In this study, 
liquidity variables were considered important but fell behind profits and dividend 
stability. When surveying institutional investors, Farrelly and Baker (1989, Pg 96) 
found that the respondents stated that profits were a better indicator of the level of 
dividends than cash flows. 
The expectation is that respondents will agree with this statement. The primary reason 
for a sustained dividend increase is an increase in profits but many companies do 
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announce special one-off dividends due to cash surpluses.20 However, this question 
should not get the same level of support that question iv) gets as most other research 
finds that profits rank higher than liquidity. 
Question vi) attempts to ascertain whether individual investors believe that managers 
will increase the dividend in an attempt to increase the share price. 
There is some support for the idea that increasing dividends can have a positive effect 
on the share price of a company. Baker and Farrelly (1988) commented that dividend 
changes may have an impact (positive in the case of a dividend increase) on share prices 
and that one of the most important reasons for paying dividends is to maintain or 
increase the company's stock price. Other studies have shown that there is a positive 
price effect for an increase in dividends (Asquith and Mullins (1983) and Healy and 
Palepu (1989)). 
Signalling literature has discussed the possibility that individual managers may try to 
use dividend increases as a signalling mechanism to cloak the true state of their 
company. This is regarded as a short term tactic as it should be difficult to fool the 
market for a long period. 
Therefore, the respondents should disagree with this statement, as the respondents 
should recognise that using the company's dividend policy as a short term tool to prop 
up the share price is a counter productive strategy in the long run. 
Question vii) investigates whether a company with no immediate investment prospects 
would increase its dividend. It is a similar question to question v) as it investigates the 
possibility of company having idle assets and paying the investor dividends. 
A shortage of possible investments was a variable included in Partington's analysis, and 
of the factors tested had the least effect on the level of dividends. Researchers have 
20Although they may choose to repurchase or cancel shares (applicable when the new Companies Act comes into force). 
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investigated the possibility of dividends being cut for investment projects (namely 
Woolridge and Ghosh) but the idea of dividends being increased due to a shortage of 
investment projects has not received a similar level of attention. 
Therefore, the respondents should disagree with this statement, as having insufficient 
investment opportunities should not relate to an increase in dividends. 
Question vii) is a clientele based question. It investigates whether individual 
shareholders believe that a company would choose to increase its dividends to attract a 
new class of investors preferring higher dividends. 
According to Shefrin and Statman (1984, Pg 280) this is plausible as "some investors 
would be willing to pay a premium for cash dividends". Therefore companies may 
increase their dividend payout to attract a new class of investor. However, Miller and 
Modigliani state that one clientele of investors is as good as another, so there is no need 
for a company to do this. 
Research has not been able to locate conclusive proof that a change in dividend policy 
will cause investors to change investments. Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986, Pg 304) 
commented that the increase in trading volume after a change in dividends only relates 
marginally to a change in clienteles, at best. 
Other researchers find that managers are unaware of the preferences of shareholders and 
even when they do, do little to try and cater towards these. Baker and Farrelly (1988, Pg 
85) state that managers considered that the "characteristics of shareholders are not an 
important determinant of dividend policy". This was not surprising, according to these 
two authors, as firms would consider it too difficult and costly to ascertain the 
characteristics and preferences of their shareholders. Therefore, they would let their 
clientele seek them out. 
However, some Australian evidence contradicts this. Hamson and Ziegler (1990, Pg 51) 
state that since the introduction of imputation credits, some companies have attempted 
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to satisfy the tax positions of their investors. To do this, they have restructured or 
initiated dividend selection programs to enable different classes of shareholders to 
receive income which best satisfies their tax positions.21 In order to do this, the 
companies must have some idea of the types of investors and their tax situation. 
On the basis of this conflicting research background, the expected result of this 
particular analysis is uncertain. It is expected that the responses will vary and this could 
make the result inconclusive. With introduction of imputation credits, it appears 
feasible for a company to increase its dividend22 in order to attract new investors. 
However, whether New Zealand companies are aware of the composition of their 
investors remains unknown. 23 Finally, evidence points towards shareholders not altering 
their portfolio drastically if a firm alters its dividend policy. 
In conclusion, for this hypothesis to be accepted, all the other statements (apart from 
question ix)) do not have to be rejected, but that question ix) will have the strongest 
support of any of the questions answered in this section indicating that the respondents 
believe that it is the most likely cause of a dividend increase. 
21 This is true in New Zealand as many companies voluntarily pay supplementary dividends to foreign investors who can't 
benefit from imputation credits. 
22Assuming that it still has imputation credits available to distribute. 
23Another problem is whether they will do anything about it. 
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Hypothesis 4: Private Investors believe a decrease in the dividend signals 
unfavourable news (such as a drop in profits) about the company. 
This hypothesis attempts to analyse the other side of the dividend signalling hypothesis, 
that dividend decreases mean that a company's performance will deteriorate. 
Previous research, from Lintner onwards, documents that managers are extremely 
reluctant to cut dividends. Even to the extent, as noted by Lintner (1956), that managers 
will not make dividend changes they may have to reverse. Baker and Farrelly (1988, Pg 
86 - 87) commented that investors interpret dividend changes as signals since most 
companies increase dividends only when they are confident that they can maintain it. 
However, they noted that firms are "reluctant to omit or cut dividends, even when the 
outlook warrants it". 
Therefore, dividend increases and dividend decreases do not have a linear relationship, 
given that managers are far more reluctant to cut dividends than they are to increase 
them. When they do increase them, a very important factor in this decision is the 
possibility that they will have to reverse it in the future. 
According to the left wing argument there are acceptable reasons to decrease dividends. 
Dividends should be reduced if it is to the shareholder's advantage. Another, possibly 
advantageous reason for a dividend cut is to fund a profitable investment. 
Section 3) employs questions ix) to question xiv) to investigate this hypothesis. 
Question ix) tests the clientele effect. It investigates whether managers' would reduce 
dividends to attract a different type of investor, possibly one more interested in the 
possibility of capital gains rather than dividend income.24 
According to Elton and Gruber (1970, Pg 68), this may occur, as a "change in dividend 
policy might cause a change in clientele". This could also cause a short run decrease in 
24such as the dividend policy of Robert Jones Investments (now Tasman Properties). 
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the stock price as the change in dividend policy is more apparent to "investors who find 
it less favourable (present stockholders) than to those who find it more favourable". 
According to Litzenberger and Ramaswamy25 this could be entirely possible. In New 
Zealand it could be quite reasonable for a company not allocating imputation credits to 
decrease its dividends. Although, if the company did allocate imputation credits with its, 
dividends then this would not be a valid reason for reducing dividends. 26 
Miller and Modigliani hypothesis that companies have no real reason to do this as one 
clientele is as good as another. It is also unlikely that managers are concerned about 
their clientele as Baker and Farrelly (1988) noted that managers do not consider the 
characteristics of shareholders when setting dividends. Abrutyn and Turner (1990, Pg 
492 - 493) support this argument as they comment that in their survey of Chief 
Executive Officers in the US, 58% of the respondents claimed not to have any idea who 
their shareholders were. Secondly, only 18 per cent of those who claimed to know the 
make-up of their investor's, indicated that the marginal tax rate of shareholders was an 
important factor determining their dividend policy. 
Two Australian researchers find evidence inconsistent with this. Hamson and Ziegler 
(1990, Pg 51) state that after the introduction of the imputation credit regime into 
Australia, companies have "attempted to satisfy the tax positions of their varied 
investors". Due to their similarities with the Australian tax systems, New Zealand 
companies should follow this. 
However, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986, Pg 304) believe that this clientele change 
effect would only be marginal at best. Firstly, few firms change their dividend policy, 
and of those, very few substantially alter it. Their results indicate that the increase in 
25V\/ho proposed the tax clientele based optimal dividend theory 
26Unless the majority of shareholders are unable to make use of imputation credits, such as those in a low tax bracket or 
foreign Investors. 
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trading volume due to a dividend change is minimal, to the extent that it does not 
indicate that investors' change shares when a firm changes its dividend policy. 
The respondents should disagree with this statement. Although it appears that 
companies are becoming more sensitive to shareholders tax positions when setting 
dividends, 27 investors do not change portfolio composition quickly, when a company 
changes its dividend policy. 
Question x) investigates whether companies are likely to lower their dividends to free 
up funds to use for investing purposes. 
Ghosh and Woolridge (1988 and 1989) investigated the share price effects of 
companies who decreased dividends to use the funds for investments. Their analysis 
revealed an initial negative reaction to this event. However the company's share pric'e 
recovered over a period of 12 months. Nevertheless, their research shows that 
companies do reduce dividends to use the funds for investment. 
Partington (1989, Pg 169) comments that investment and dividend policy can be 
independent. According to this author, the empirical results are inconclusive, but it 
suggests that firms usually raise sufficient finance to allow independence between 
investment and financing decisions. Although, on occas10n, a financing constraint 
forces interdependence between these two. 
The respondents should agree (albeit slightly) with this hypothesis as it is plausible for a 
company to reduce dividends to free up funds for investment. 
Question xi) deals with a similar issue, except that the company intends to reduce debt 
by reducing dividends. 
27 Especially after the introduction of imputation credits, 
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Again there is very little research on whether firms will attempt to reduce debt by 
reducing dividends. Partington (pg 169) comments that a company's leverage and level 
of debt may affect its capacity to pay dividends, but the available empirical evidence 
provides no strong conclusions. The results of his analysis showed little correlation (less 
than most other elements analysed) between debt reduction and dividends. 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990, Pg 1415 - 1421) investigated the relationship between 
dividend policy and financial distress. In their investigation, more than half of the firms 
sampled faced binding debt covenants in the year in which they reduced dividends. 
However, many sample firms reduced dividends "when covenants were far from 
binding". When this was analysed further, they found that few companies reduced their 
dividends to raise funding for binding debt covenants. Ravid and Sarig (1991, Pg 175) 
support this as they comment that managers are very reluctant to cut dividends, "even in 
the face of debt repayment pressures". This raises doubts about the importance of debt 
covenants in relation to a company's dividend policy. 
The respondents should disagree with this question, as the available literature finds little 
relationship between financing and setting dividends. 
Question xii) investigates the possibility that a predicted decrease in profits will cause a 
decrease in dividends. 
There is considerable research linking dividend cuts to an expected decrease in 
profitability. DeAngelo et al (1992, Pg 27) conclude that income is a critical 
determinant of dividend changes. Due to managerial reluctance to cut dividends, it will 
only be done when earnings are especially poor. Therefore a loss is considered a 
necessary condition for a firm to cut its dividend. DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990, Pg 
1428) commented that the larger the decrease in earnings, the more likely the firm was 
to decrease dividends. Partington found profits (or the lack off) to be the primary 
determinant of the level of dividends paid. 
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The vast majority of research available shows that dividends correlate (highly) to 
profits. Therefore the respondents should agree with this question. 
Question xiii) investigates the possibility that the company has insufficient liquidity to 
continue trading in its present form and pay the dividend. Therefore the company may 
be forced to reduce dividends. 
Partington (Pg 169) comments that although this variable can affect the ability to pay 
dividends, mixed empirical evidence exists. It is plausible that a firm facing a financing 
constraint, such as a shortage of liquidity, may have to limit the growth of dividends. 
Respondents should agree with this question, as a shortage of funds will reduce a firm's 
ability to pay dividends. This variable should not rate as highly as the profit variable. 
Question xiv) is more of a dummy question. It is investigating a factor proposed by 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990) 
In their analysis, they investigated firms which cut dividends voluntarily. One 
explanation found for this was to enhance the firm's bargaining position with organised 
labour. These authors found evidence which supported this proposition while 
investigating the sample firms. 
However, although DeAngelo and DeAngelo felt that these firms were able to 
legitimise this result as firstly, these firms were such a small part of the sample and 
secondly, the policy of reducing dividends to be able to increase wages has little 
empirical background. 
The majority of the respondents are expected to be either uncertain or will disagree with 
this statement. 
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Conclusion 
For this hypothesis to be accepted, question xii) will receive the strongest support out of 
any of those analysed here. The respondents should believe that the most important 
reason for dividend cut is an expected decrease in profits. 
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Hypothesis 4a: There exists an inverse relationship between the reasons 
for a dividend increase and decrease. 
This hypothesis investigates whether an inverse relationship exists between dividend 
increases and decreases, so that any variable, such as a change in profitability, is just as 
likely to cause a dividend increase or decrease. To investigate this hypothesis, a 
comparison of the results from the four sets of paired28 questions from section 2 and 
section 3 will indicate whether an inverse relationship exists. 
If the distribution of the responses are the same (or not significantly different), then this 
indicates that the factor being analysed is just as likely (according to individual 
investors) to cause dividends to increase or decrease. However, if the distribution of 
responses to each set of questions are different, this indicates that the respondents 
believe that a particular factor (such as profitability) effects dividend increases and 
decreases differently. 
Unfortunately there is very little literature available which has tested this proposition, 
although some evidence exists for the four sets of factors being tested. Due to the lack 
of literature available, much of this investigation is exploratory by nature. 
The four questions included in testing this hypothesis are as follows. As an increase or 
decrease in dividends is due to: 
a) Question 4 and 12: An expected change in profits. 
b) Question 5 and 13: The company's liquidity levels. 
c) Question 7 and 10: The availability of investments. 
d) Question 8 and 9: The clientele effect. 
2B Questions dealing with the same variable, eg Question 4: Profit increase, and Question 12: profit decrease. 
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Section a: Expected change in profits. 
According to the majority of signalling literature available, the primary cause of a 
change in dividends is the availability of profits. Examples of this are; Partington 
(1989) who finds profits to be the main determinant of dividends and DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo who agree that the primary reason for a dividend cut is a decrease in profits. 
Therefore the respondents should indicate that profit changes are just as likely to cause 
dividend decreases as increases. 
Section b: The company's liquidity levels. 
Again little literature exists which has analysed this particular proposition. What is 
available indicates that changes in liquidity can affect a company's ability to pay 
dividends (see Partington (1989)). 
Therefore, since there is very little literature available analysing this phenomenon, the 
expected result is for the distribution of the responses to be similar. 
Section c: The availability of investments. 
Of the factors analysed by Partington (1989), this factor had the least effect over the 
level of dividends paid. More evidence is available when analysing dividend decreases, 
as Ghosh and Woolridge (1988 and 1989) show that companies do decrease dividends 
to free up funds for investing purposes. 
Again, due to the lack of evidence available, this set of questions is expected to have the 
same distribution of responses. 
Section d: The Clientele effect 
Of the four sets of questions analysed, this particular pair of questions has the most 
empirical support available. According to Litzenberger and Ramaswamy, a company 
should set their dividend policy in accordance with the tax laws, as to maximise the 
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shareholders' wealth and cash-flow. Therefore a company should be equally likely to 
cut or raise its dividends in order to provide the greatest benefit to its shareholders. 
Therefore, these two questions should receive a similar distribution of responses. 
Conclusion 
Company managers do increase and decrease dividends for different reasons, for as 
Lintner noted, managers are far more reluctant to cut dividends than they are to increase 
them. However, few researchers have analysed the relationship between the variables 
involved with setting dividends and their effect on dividend increases and decreases. 
If the hypothesised results do not occur, this will indicate that investors believe that 
dividend increases and decreases occur because of different reasons. 
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Hypothesis 5: There exists among New Zealand Private Shareholders an 
"age clientele", in which (in contrast to younger shareholders), older 
shareholders have a preference for shares paying a higher dividend. 
This hypothesis investigates the proposition that older investors form a clientele which 
chooses investments which pay a higher dividend. 29 To investigate this hypothesis, this 
analysis uses the results from section one (especially questions ii) and iii)), section 4 
and section 5 of the survey. 
According to the age clientele hypothesis, as an individual gets older, they should 
disagree with question ii) and agree with question iii) more strongly than a younger 
individual. This may extend to question i) as an older individual may believe that 
dividends have more of an influence on the value of a share more than a younger 
investor. A similar pattern should occur in section 4; as the individual gets older, 
dividends (and imputation credits) will become more important to them. 
As has been shown in the section outlining the clientele effect, there is considerable 
evidence supporting the existence of age clientele's. According to Crockett and Friend 
(1988, Pg 604) this investor subgroup "may quite rationally show a preference for 
dividends". Furthermore Lewellen, Stanley, Lease, and Schlarbaum (1978, Pg 1396) 
found that shares with a high dividend yield have a "disproportionate concentration of 
older investor owners". 
The corresponding opposite effect exists in younger investors. Baker and Haslem (1974, 
Pg 1261) segregated private investors into two distinct classes. The first consisted of 
investors concerned with capital appreciation and these investors were younger on 
average. This class of investors was more willing to sacrifice current dividends for 
future price appreciation. The second class consists of investors concerned with income 
from dividends and these tended to be older. This effect receives confirmation from 
Lease, Lewellen and Schlarbaum, (1976, Pg 56 - 57) who found that as the investor's 
29That is, compared to younger investors. 
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age increased "short term capital gains diminish in proclaimed importance 11 and the 
investor places more emphasis on dividend income. 
However, it is uncertain whether an age clientele hypothesis will exist in New Zealand 
which is due to the following reasons: 
A) The first reason is the sur charge on the pension. If the individual chooses to accept 
the pension and earns above a certain level of income, they become liable for an extra 
25 cents tax on every dollar earnt. 
B) Secondly, no capital gains tax exists in New Zealand (unless the individual is 
identified by the I.R.D as a frequent trader). Therefore, income derived from selling 
securities has no tax implications for a retired individual on the pension. 
C) Finally, individuals have the choice to accept the pension so wealthier individuals 
may choose not to and avoid the sur charge. 30 These individuals pay tax at the same rate 
of an ordinary taxpayer. 
The age clientele hypothesis was developed for a tax system in which similar tax rates 
existed on capital gains and dividend income. However, in New Zealand, if an investor 
receiving the pension was to receive an unimputed dividend, they would pay 
approximately 58 cents on the dollar in tax. If they received a fully imputed dividend, 
they would only pay 25 cents tax. If they sold shares to obtain an income, they would 
only pay the transaction costs (to the broker) involved. Table X reviews this situation. 
3
°For the purpose of this research no methodology is available to see whether the respondent receives the pension or 
chooses not to. 
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Table 2.1: Effective tax rates for those receiving the pension 
Source of Income 
Unimputed Dividends 
Imputed Dividend 
Capital Gains 
Conclusion 
Tax Rate 
No Pension 
.33 
0 
0 
Pension 
.58 
.25 
0 
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This does not mean that an age clientele effect doesn't exist in New Zealand. These 
issues may make it more difficult to identify one, but despite this, older shareholders 
may prefer to fund their consumption (when older) from dividends. Evidence of this 
could exist in an analysis of the older shareholder's preference for imputed dividends. If 
they prefer to fund consumption from dividends, then imputation credits should also be 
very important. 
Part Ill 
Background to Empirical Research 
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Research Methodology 
The purpose of this thesis is to ask New Zealand shareholders about the impact of 
dividends on company valuation and what they communicate about a company. To 
achieve this goal a mail survey was used. 
For the research in question, this has several distinct advantages: 
a) It is very cost effective (being an overriding influence). 
b) It enables New Zealand shareholders (not just a sub-section) to be analysed. 
c) The research will be generalisable to the population. 
According to Fowler (1984, Pg 211) the goal of a survey is to measure the respondent's 
attitude towards a subject, so that it will hopefully describe their behaviour in terms of 
the subject being analysed. Ajzen and Fishbein (1980, Pg 40) paraphrase this as 
"intentions determine behaviours". They caution that a measure of intention (as given 
by a survey) does not always give an accurate prediction of behaviour as the 
individual's intention may not remain stable over time. Nevertheless, research supports 
the assertion that the views' respondents express in a survey, should translate to their 
real life activity. 
For a survey to be effective, according to Fowler (1984, Pg 209), the questionnaire 
must translate the research objectives into: 
• questions which resolve the objective, 
• motivate the respondent to respond. 
Therefore, after choosing to use a mail survey to analyse the research objective, the 
researcher must take all the appropriate steps to ensure it asks the relevant questions and 
designed in such a format that the respondents will reply. 
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Mail Survey Advantages 
Moser and Kalton (1971, Pg 257 - 258) highlight several advantages of using mail 
surveys to collect data: 
a) It is cheaper than other methods (such as telephone surveys). 
b) The researcher can contact a widely spread population, which is especially valuable 
when "rare and scattered populations" are being investigated. 
c) It is a relatively quick method for conducting a survey 
d) The use of a mail survey avoids some of the biases involved with other types of 
surveys, such as interviewer bias. 
e) A major advantage is that the respondents have time to think about their answers and 
change them if they wish. 
A further advantage of a mail survey is that the respondent remains anonymous. 
Individual shareholders will be more likely to divulge information if their responses are 
confidential and they are given assurance of this. 
Another important factor in the choice of a mail survey is that it should be the most 
effective methodology available to contact all potential respondents. A telephone survey 
may have difficulty in contacting the individual for a variety of reasons. Such as: the 
respondents may not be available and may be difficult to contact. 
Mail Survey Disadvantages 
Moser and Kalton (Pg 260 - 261) also highlight several of the disadvantages involved 
with mail surveys: 
a) The questions have to be simple, straightforward and easy to understand. This is a 
complicated factor in the design of a questionnaire as a survey has to deal with all levels 
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of ability and knowledge. Therefore all respondents must understand the questions the 
survey asks them. 
b) The answers received to the questionnaire have to be accepted as final, as no 
interpretation of a possibly incorrect and invalid answer is allowed. 
c) The survey designer can never be sure that the right person completes the 
questionnaire, even if the survey is addressed to the individual being surveyed. 
According to Wallace and Mellor (1988) one of the largest concerns with mail surveys 
is the problem of its low record of response rate. Surveys receiving a low level of 
response are very susceptible to the problems of non response bias. 
Another major problem with surveys, according to Brennan (1991, Pg 73) is that 
respondents may no longer believe that their responses stay confidential. This is due to 
11 Sugging11 , where surveys are part of a marketing technique. 
Selection Procedures 
The shareholders used in this survey were randomly selected from eight companies. The 
process of selection entailed selecting the companies, then selecting the shareholders. 
The objective behind the selection of the companies was to choose a group of 
companies with a variety of dividend history's. The eight (chosen as an arbitrary level) 
companies selected conformed to four classifications (two in each classification) related 
to the trend in their dividend payout over the last four years (up to 1992): 
a) Those who didn't pay a dividend, 
b) Those paying a stable dividend, 
c) Those whose dividends had increased over the last two to three years 
d) Those whose dividends had decreased over the last two to three years. 
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Then to stratify the sample further, the eligible companies were ranked according to 
their relative size (in terms of capitalisation1 or share turnover2). When completed, a 
large company and a small one (hopefully in terms of both market capitalisation and 
turnover) in each dividend classification will have been selected. 
This process should hopefully overcome a possible bias of shareholders targeting 
specific types of companies with specific dividend policies. By selecting companies 
with this range of attributes, there exists a good chance of obtaining a well-stratified 
survey population. 
The data used to form this sample came from the New Zealand Stock Exchange 
Sharemarket Review. The only restricting criterion for inclusion in the sample was that 
the company had to be New Zealand registered and used Registry Managers in 
Auckland as its register.3 
The companies selected were:4 
a) No Dividends 
1989 1990 1991 1992 capital turnover 
Dividend in Cents dividend dividend dividend dividend million million 
Triumph Industries Ltd 0 0 0 0 1.657 17.762 
Kingsgate lnt'I Corp. Ltd 0 0 0 0 131 10.744 
Kingsgate was the largest company (according to its paid up capital) consistently paying 
no dividend for the last four years. 
1 As it represents the shareholders investment in the company at par value. 
2As it gives a reasonable indication of how frequently traded the security is. This will be important as companies that trade 
more often usually tend to have a higher concentration of institutional ownership. 
3This should not Introduce a significant bias as the majority of New Zealand companies use Registry Manager's for their 
share registry. Also, if shareholders own shares in several companies, then the majority of these companies should be 
registered at Registry Manager's. 
4Before the 1993 year end annual reports were available. 
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b) Constant Dividends 
1989 1990 1991 1992 capital turnover 
Dividend in Cents dividend dividend dividend dividend million million 
Milburn New Zealand Ltd 18 20 20 20 20 412 
Brierley Investments Ltd 10 11 9 9 1409 821.944 
Both these companies paid relatively stable dividends over the last four years. 
c) Increasing dividends 
1989 1990 1991 1992 capital turnover 
Dividend in Cents dividend dividend dividend dividend million million 
U-Bix Business Machines 5 17.5 21 23.5 .196 5.689 
Wilson and Horton Group 6 15 15 17 87.459 22 
Both these companies increased dividends over the last four years. 
d) Decreasing Dividends 
1989 1990 1991 1992 capital turnover 
Dividend in Cents dividend dividend dividend dividend million million 
New Zealand Light 17.5 17.5 5 7.5 3 .779 
Leathers Ltd 
Fletcher Challenge Ltd 27 27 27 14 758 321 
Although the New Zealand Light Leather dividend has increased slightly over the last 
year, it is still below its 1990 level where it cut its dividend to 5 cents. 
Individual Shareholder Selection 
The listing of New Zealand shareholder came from Registry Managers in Auckland. 
The list of shareholders came from a random selection of 3 5 individuals5 from each of 
the companies chosen. 
5Excluding any companies or other institutions. 
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Survey Design Issues 
The available literature provided good guidance on designing a questionnaire, and 
better advice on what to avoid. According to Erdos (1970, Pg 45), the most unfortunate 
mistake to make when designing a questionnaire, is to produce something reminding the 
recipients of an "income tax form". The suggested overall philosophy behind designing 
a survey is to "give the impression of a neat printed page which is easy to read and easy 
to fill out". This was the guiding philosophy behind the design of the survey. 
The other major influence over the design of the survey was to allow all the recipients 
to be able to understand the questions and complete the survey. To do this, according to 
Moser and Kalton (1971, Pg 320), the survey designer must put themselves "in the 
position of the least educated respondents". This is especially relevant when designing a 
questionnaire which is to be distributed to a wide section of the community. 
Therefore, the survey was designed so it would appear short and relatively easy for the 
respondent to complete. Erdos (1970, Pg 39 - 42) establishes several guidelines to use 
in the design of a survey: 
• The survey instrument had a four page limit imposed upon it, 
• The survey avoided illustrations and pictures because it would make the 
questionnaire look too much like an advertisement, 
• The survey did not use coloured paper, because this makes a survey resemble junk 
mail, 
• The final piece of practical advice was to print on both sides of the paper. 
When compiling the questionnaire, the first step was to group the questions into their 
relevant sections. Therefore, the survey was divided up into five sections; the first 
investigated optimal dividend theories, the next two investigated dividend increases and 
decreases, and the fourth investigated the influence that dividends have over share 
valuation. The fifth asked for two demographic variables. Erdos (Pg 48) states that it is 
advisable to group questions into sections by subject matter. 
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The first question in a survey is of great significance. According to Moser and Kalton 
(1971, Pg 346), the early questions should be easy and interesting, not on sensitive or 
difficult topics and the questions should flow in a logical manner. Erdos (Pg 60) states 
that the introductory question should connect the survey with an issue which is very 
important to the respondent, or to the subject matter. Therefore, the most obvious 
question, given that the covering letter informed the respondents they were completing 
a survey of dividend policy, was to ask them whether dividends affected the price of a 
share. 
From this stage, two choices of question flow for a survey exist. The first is the funnel 
sequence, where each question relates to the previous question and the survey grows 
more detailed as it progresses. According to Bailey (1982, Pg 221), this approach helps 
the respondent recall information more efficiently. The other suggested approach is the 
'Inverted Funnel Sequence' where narrower questions about smaller issues precede 
broader questions. This type of question flow is useful when the survey topic is not 
motivational and it can help the respondents to begin with easier questions and end with 
the more difficult ones. 
The inverted funnel sequence of questions appeared to be the most appropriate form of 
question flow to adopt here. The survey investigates some very difficult issues (the 
relative impact of dividends on share valuations), and for the reasons highlighted above, 
the question flow suited the topic better. Therefore (excluding the demographic 
variables obtained last), the first section was relatively straightforward. The next two 
sections were very similar and reasonably simple, while the last section, by its own 
exploratory nature, was difficult, and placed near the end. 
The next step was to consider question design, as two types of questions exist, closed 
ended and open ended. Bailey (Pg 214) states that closed ended questions are suitable 
when the objective is to "lead the respondent to agree or disagree with a specific point 
of view". Since the objective of this thesis is to investigate dividend theory and accept or 
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reject the hypotheses, this form of question format seemed appropriate. Therefore, the 
respondents (for the most part) were answering a Likert scale question. 6 However, 
given the exploratory nature of some of the areas analysed, the survey employed open 
ended questions if the respondent thought that they had something more to add. The 
main use of these questions will be to guide further research if the questions used are 
misspecified. 
There are several advantages and disadvantages involved with the use of this type of 
question design. According to Bailey (Pg 213 - 214) close ended questions introduce a 
bias to the research as it forces the respondent to choose from the given alternatives. On 
the other hand, a major advantage is that closed ended questions require less motivation 
from the respondents and this may improve the response rate. 
The only other major consideration in the design of the questionnaire is the choice of 
question type. Surveys appear to use two main types of closed ended questions; ranking 
and ratings. According to Bailey (Pg 221) surveys use ranking type questions when the 
researcher requires information regarding the degree of importance that people give to a 
set of attitudes or objects. Surveys use rating to test how much an individual agrees or 
disagrees with a particular statement. Since several propositions are being tested to see 
whether individuals agree or disagree with them, rating appears most applicable. 
However, the use of a ranking scale would be very effective in investigating the 
information signalling hypothesis, as the individual could rank the factors most likely to 
cause a dividend change. This appeared to have major advantages, but the available 
literature highlights several drawbacks of this method. Bailey (Pg 222) states that 
research has shown that respondents, when asked to rank values or items, will rank the 
items appearing first higher than the later items. Secondly, Erdos (1970, Pg 69) states 
that a significant problem with ranking is that the respondents may not be able to 
6Even section four uses an adjusted form of a Liker! scale. 
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choose between the possible alternatives and "then may have to force the issue or give a 
bad answer or not answer at all". It appears the use of the ranking methodology by 
itself is unsafe. 
A possible solution is to use a combination of both the ranking method and the rating 
method. Erdos (1970, Pg 69) admits that the use of both ranking and rating questions in 
a survey can be useful, but he does not advise the use of both systems on the same 
questionnaire, as the switch from ranking to rating, "will tend to confuse the 
respondents". Therefore, the questionnaire avoided using ranking scales and all the 
questions were rating questions. 
The survey was extensively pre - tested, for according to Moser and Kalton (1971, Pg 
310), the use of a pilot study is a very helpful tool as the questions require testing. The 
first group to pre-test the survey were a dozen stage 1 accounting students (who owned 
shares). Although these students were younger than the average respondent (the oldest 
still being in their 20's), they all owned shares and would hopefully have a similar level 
6f investing experience as the least experienced respondents completing the survey. The 
survey was also pre-tested on several staff members of the department, especially those 
with experience in the design and implementation of surveys. Finally, it was pre-tested 
at a Lawyers firm, on both the secretary's and the lawyers. All the groups pre-tested 
indicated that they had no major problems completing the survey and each group did 
off er advice and suggestions for improving the survey's design. 
Covering letter 
According to Bailey (Pg 228) the covering letter for a survey should do four main 
things. It should identify the organisation conducting the research, explain to the 
respondents the purpose of the study, tell them why the research is important and assure 
them that their responses will remain confidential. Moser and Kalton (1971, Pg 303) 
add two more items to this list, as a covering letter should; tell the subject that they 
represent a cross section of population and tell them what they must do. 
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When designing the initial covermg letter, these points formed the basis for its 
construction. The two follow up letters reiterated some of the more important points, 
especially the benefit to the research achieved if they replied. 
According to Erdos (1970, Pg 105 - 109) the letter should look as if personally written 
to the subject, such that the recipient's name is "typed in to match the body of the letter" 
and the letter should end with the sender's signature signed in blue pen. The goal of the 
covering letter is to give the reader the impression that they are very important to the 
research. 
The final element for the letter, was to type it on departmental letter head. This, as well 
as stating it in my introductory letter, would highlight to the subject that the survey is 
for research purposes and is not an attempt at Sugging. Several researchers have noted 
that university endorsement enhances the response rate of survey's (see Scott (1961), 
Fox et al (1988)). 
Other specific efforts made to increase response rate 
Apart from the ideas previously mentioned two other procedures were used to increase 
the response rate. 
The first was to enclose a self addressed stamped envelope so the respondent did not 
have to pay to respond to the survey. Fox et al (1988) reports that this has a positive 
effect on the response rate. 
The other step used to increase the response rate was to use follow up mailings. Fowler 
(1984) comments that after ten days from the initial mailing, all the remaining non-
responders should be mailed a reminder letter. This letter should emphasise the 
importance of the study and a high rate of response. Then, after another ten days, he 
suggests mailing another letter, again emphasising the importance of a high return. This 
time another questionnaire should be included for "those who threw one away". A final 
step, if necessary, is to call the remaining non-responders in order to get them to 
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respond. Herbelien and Baumgartner (1978) report that the use of follow ups 1s 
normally successful in increasing the overall response rate. 
The design process followed all the appropriate steps as shown by the literature 
available. The survey content should interest the respondents and enhance the response 
rate. Brennan (1991, Pg 79) states that most respondents refuse to participate in surveys 
because of "temporary conditions", such as a lack of interest in the topic or that they 
were too busy. Hopefully the survey design will overcome these problems. 
Analysis of Results 
This study utilised two separate statistical packages to analyse the results, the first being 
the SAS statistical package and the second being 'The ISTAT' Version 5.3 (1987). The 
SAS package was used for creating histograms and conducting regression analyses, 
while 'The ISTAT' package was used for conducting the Chi Square tests. 
The first problem involved in the analysis of the data is to decide what form of 
statistical methodology to use. The majority of data collected results from a Likert 
Scale analysis. Most currently available statistical literature suggests that it is an ordinal 
scale, as it is very difficult to measure the 'distance between each point' in a Likert Scale 
(see Zikmund (1991), and Aaker and Day (19907)). The suggested methodology for 
analysing this form of data is non-parametric statistical techniques. 
The non-parametric techniques applied to this analysis was the Chi Square analysis. 
Other non-parametric techniques such as the Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks 
Test and the Mann-Whitney Test were not appropriate for this research, given the 
limited range of results (a whole number between 1 and 5) and a large number of 'equal 
ranks' in the results. These patterns made the use of these methodologies impossible. 
7 Although in their 1986 version, these authors reported that Likert Scales could be regarded as a 'quasi-interval' scale. 
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According to Aaker and Day (1990) analysis of this type of data, is normally based on 
the assumption that the data is of an interval type (rather than ordinal). Furthermore, 
previous researchers working in finance who have used the Likert Scale to examine 
dividend policy phenomena (such as Baker, Farrelly and Edelman (1985) and Baker 
and Haslem (1973)) have all used basic parametric statistics to analyse their results. 
Therefore, this research will utilise parametric statistics. 
Furthermore, parametric Z score tests (given that the sample size is well in excess of 
30) will be used to analyse the data, mainly for sections 1, 2 and 3. In the initial 
analysis of section 4, where the respondents had indicated uncertainty, these data points 
were withdrawn from the analysis to give the data the form of an interval scale. 
However, when analysing section 4 further, the application of parametric 
methodologies is unacceptable as this data does not conform to the requirements of 
interval data. The initial analysis of section 4 using this methodology is only 
exploratory, justifying the methodology used. 
The analysis also investigated the skew in the data. The results obtained for this may be 
unreliable since most of the data will have a value between one and five (depending on 
the response). Therefore, a difference will occur between the result achieved and the 
mean (which can be 3.47). This may make the results of this analysis less reliable as 
they may be influenced by how far away the mean is from one of the ordinal data 
points. Nevertheless, the investigation discusses the results obtained from the measure 
of skew tests. 8 
These different methodologies will also provide the added benefit of a form of double 
checking, as each of the methodologies results should hopefully complement each other 
and provide more evidence in favour of or against the proposition being analysed. 
8This did not include questions' 15 to 23 as the data does not have very strong interval qualities. 
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When analysing the results, an alpha (a) level of 0.05 or less is significant. Any result 
which showed a lower level of significance is not conclusive or significant in this 
research. 
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Preliminary Investigation 
After excluding the potential respondents who did not reply, could not reply and did not 
fill the questionnaire out correctly,9 the overall useable response rate is 68.4%. This 
high response rate justifies the methods used to increase the response rate. 
Response Analysis 
Total Sample 280 
Moved, no forwarding Address 18 
Unable to rep1y1o 9 
Effective Sample 253 
Non - responses 65 
Response received 188 
Refusal to participate11 10 
Unusable response 5 
Useable responses 173 
Response Rate 74.3% 
Useable response rate 68.4% 
After sending out the first copy of the survey on the 4th of August, the responses 
returned over a period of 32 working days. On the 19th of August, all non responders 
were sent a follow up letter and a second follow up (this one including a further copy of 
the survey) was mailed on the 27th of August. Both these follow ups appeared to be 
relatively successful at increasing the response rate, as indicated by graph 3.1 
9The criteria for inclusion in the overall useable response was that the respondent had completed at least one of the 
sections in the survey (as the survey is being investigated in sections). As it was, respondents who were excluded had 
not fully completed any of the sections. 
1°Respondent physically unable to respond, due to death or illness. 
11 rncludes those who claimed that they had insufficient knowledge to complete the survey. 
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Graph 3.1: Responses to the survey. 
Demographics 
The survey only collected two forms of demographic information. The age of the 
respondent and the number of shares that each respondent owned at the time they were 
completing the survey. 
Graph 3.2: Age of the respondents 
Age 41 - 50 (17%) 
Age 51 - 60 (17%) 
Of the useable responses, four individuals refused to disclose their age, which left 169 
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(98%) respondents to analyse the clientele effect. The average age was in the 41 - 50 
range. However, the clear trend is that most responders were older than 50 (60%). 
Graph 3.3: Portfolio size of the respondents. 
Own 6 - 10 Co's (24%) Own 1 - 5 Co's (46%) 
The other demographic variable investigated was the size of the portfolio that each 
individual owned. Of these, 15 respondents refused to disclose how many companies 
they owned shares in. This left 157 (91.3%) useable responses for this demographic 
variable. The average size of a portfolio was about 8 companies, however outliers 
influenced this result, as the mode was 2 companies. The survey included this question 
to investigate whether the shareholders listed at Registry Managers (NZ) Ltd, still 
owned shares, as the results indicated that 7% of the respondents currently did not own 
any shares. 
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Non Response Bias in Mail Surveys 
According to Clausen (1947), four main sources of bias exist when conducting a 
survey: non-response bias, a group replies instead of an individual, a response being 
received from other than the addressee and that the respondent consults sources of 
information when their level of knowledge is being surveyed. Of these, the one with the 
highest propensity to invalidate research is the problem of non-response; where the 
subject does not respond to the survey. According to Fowler (1984): 
No Mail Survey can be considered reliable unless it has a minimum of 50 
percent response, or unless it demonstrates with some form of verification 
that the nonrespondents are similar to the respondents. 
Therefore, it is very important to try and reduce this problem. This is overcome by 
increasing the response rate from the survey to a sufficiently high enough level (which 
is economically viable). 
Researchers have noted that several differences exist between responders and non-
responders. A consistent finding about non-responders (see Bachrack and Scoble 
(1967), Ognibene (1970)) is that they tend to come from lower income groups. 
Whereas, for responders (especially early responders) the inverse is true. Clausen 
(1947) notes that responders, in general, have a higher education level from non 
responders. Fowler (1984) also reported that better educated people normally reply 
faster. 
Of the research conducted in New Zealand, Brennan (1991, Pg 79-82) found that most 
non responders refuse to participate in a survey because of "temporary conditions", such 
as having a lack of interest in the topic or being too busy. In this study, non responders 
were classified as: 
• 14% had forgotten to complete it, 
• 9% didn't get around to it, 
• 14% felt it was an invasion of their privacy, 
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• 9% thought the questionnaire was of poor quality. 
This author comments that on the whole, non-respondents thought that mail surveys 
were either too personal or took too long to complete. 
Therefore, all survey research must attempt to overcome this problem (initially by 
ensuring a high response rate) and then attempt to identify the extent of the problem. 
According to Wallace and Mellor (1988, Pg 132 - 133), there are three types of tests 
available to investigate for the existence of non-response bias: 
a) The first is to check the responses by date of reply, 
b) The second is to compare the respondents against known characteristics of a sampled 
population. 
c) The third is to compare the characteristics of the responders to non responders. 
The first approach is the most appropriate to adopt in this research. This entails 
comparing the replies of early and late responders to see if there are any significant 
differences between the two. If there is, this indicates the existence of non response 
bias. According to Wallace and Mellor (Pg 135) late responders12 have similar 
characteristics to non-respondents. Other researchers (Fowler (1984)) acknowledge that 
this is the appropriate technique to analyse this problem. 
The other two techniques are not appropriate for this research, as insufficient 
information exists about the potential population to make any inferences. 
Assessment of Non response Bias 
The technique used to assess non-response bias is to compare the responses of late 
responders to those of early responders. This particular analysis compared the first 50 
responders to the last 50 responders. The choice of the number of respondents was an 
arbitrary one, but it should highlight the differences between the early responders and 
12Actually defined as very late responders. 
Dividend Policy and Private Shareholders 94 
the late responders. This will give a better indication of the potential for non response 
bias. 13 
A Chi Square Goodness of Fit test was used to test for differences in overall distribution 
(that is, did the pattern of responses for the early responders match that of the late 
responders) in the proportion of respondents who agreed and disagreed with a question 
(whether late responders were more likely to agree or disagree with a question than 
early responders). 
Statistical literature supports the use of non parametric statistics as it points out that it is 
very difficult to assign a set interval to results obtained from a Likert Scale. Therefore, 
an analysis of the differences in those agreeing, uncertain or disagreeing should be the 
most reliable test. 
Results 
Statistically significant differences between late and early responders existed for six of 
the questions (mostly in section 3). However, there was no significant differences 
between the age of early and late respondents. 
The differences in responses are: 
Question 9: Significantly different at the 0.025 level. 
Later responders do not disagree as much as earlier responders to this question. When 
analysing whether later responders agree or disagree more with the proposition, the 
analysis indicated a significant difference between early and late responders (p = 0.05) 
but this result may be inaccurate given the small size of the expected frequencies. 
13That is, comparing very later repliers to very early repliers to gain a more stringent indication of possible non-response 
problems. 
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The next five questions in which a significant difference between the early responders 
and late responders occurred, supports the available research, as later responders have a 
higher level of uncertainty than earlier responders. 
This occurred in Question 11 (p = 0.05), Question 12 (p = 0.01) Question 13: (p = 
0.001), Question 18 (p = 0.025) and Question 19 (p = 0.001) 
Therefore, it appears that some form of non-response bias occurs, as late responders are 
more likely to be uncertain about a question (hence the non responders are more likely 
to be uncertain about a question). When reviewing the data, the trend of increasing 
uncertainty is apparent, but it is only significant for these questions. 
Managing Non-response bias 
This analysis reveals that of non response bias does exist m the data collected. 
However, this problem is unlikely to be significant. This is because: 
That a high proportion of the respondents are uncertain about their response for each 
question. Such examples are question 19 (23%), question 20 (33.5%) and question 23 
(34.1 %). Yet a significant difference between late and early responders occurred only 
for question 19. 14 Therefore, high levels of uncertainty will exist for some of the 
propositions analysed. 
That, the high response rate achieved for the survey reduced the possibility of non-
response bias. 
14out of this subset. 
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Table 3.4 from Fowler (1984, Pg 51) supports this assertion. 
Percentage of non-respondents with characteristics 
Response Rate (%) 10 20 25 30 40 50 75 
80% 28 26 25 24 21 19 13 
70% 31 27 25 23 19 14 3 
60% 35 28 25 22 15 8 
50% 40 30 25 20 10 
(True population mean= 25%) 
This table shows that as the response rate increases, a higher level of deviation in the 
non-respondents must occur before any non response bias becomes significant. Since 
this survey has achieved a 70% response rate, a high level of deviation in the non-
respondents must occur to make non-response bias a significant problem. It appears that 
no significant non response bias will occur, therefore no attempt to compensate for it 
will occur. 
Assessment of Item Non-response 
According to Gilley and Leone (1991, Pg 282), item (or partial) non-response occurs 
when a questionnaire contains one or more questions which the respondent does not 
answer. Although this does not invalidate the response, it does pose practical problems 
when applying statistical packages, such as SAS, as they will exclude those respondents' 
answers from the analysis. 
These authors comment that this particular problem has received little attention in the 
literature, but a few standard techniques are available to address this problem. 
According to these two authors, the typical procedure is to substitute the mean value 
from all respondents for an incomplete answer, but the researcher must be certain that 
these items are missing at random. 
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When the responses with instances of item non-response were reviewed, it was apparent 
that only a very small proportion of surveys returned had this problem. When analysing 
them in detail, some respondents indicated that they were unable to answer the 
question.15 In these instance's the analysis substituted the response representing 
uncertainty, as this is the closest approximation to their views. 
For the remaining cases, the accepted methodology is to substitute the mean value in for 
the missing data point. When using parametric statistical techniques with interval data, 
this methodology is appropriate (when the missing points are random). However, since 
most of the analysis used in the research utilises non-parametric statistic techniques, 
substituting the mean value creates a new ordinal data category. Therefore, it appears 
most appropriate to substitute in the value representing uncertainty for all instances of 
item non-responses. It also makes more intuitive sense that an individual who did not 
respond to a question would be uncertain about it rather than agreeing with the mean 
response. 
15 As either they couldn't understand the question or disagreed with the form of the question. 
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Explanation of the Results: 
Coding of the responses began after the majority of surveys had returned.1 6 To make 
the analysis easier to understand, an explanation of the methodology used to categorise 
each answer follows. 
For Questions 1 through to 14. The Question format was as follows: 
Question 1: Dividends affect the value of a share. 
Strongly 
Agree 
5 
Agree 
4 
Uncertain Disagree 
3 2 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 
Every time the respondent answered that they strongly agreed with a proposition, the 
answer equated to a 5 on the scale. If they were uncertain, the answer equalled 3. 
Therefore, when the mean of the results was significantly greater than 311 (indicating 
uncertainty), then the respondents agreed with the proposition and if the mean was 
significantly lower than 3 they disagreed with it. 
For Questions 15 through to 23: the same principle applied. 
Question 23: Comparing Imputation Credits to the Earnings Per Share factor. 
Imputation Credits have 
More 
Influence 
D 
4 
Same less 
Influence Influence 
D D 
3 2 
Uncertain 
than EPS D 
1 
Therefore, when the individual answering the question thought that the factor on the left 
was more important (this time being Imputation credits), they would place a tick in the 
box provided and these responses received a 4. If the individual thought the other value 
16of those that would return. 
17 As determined later. 
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was more important (Earnings Per Share), they placed a tick m that box and the 
response equalled 2. 
If the respondent felt that they both had a similar effect on the price of share they ticked 
the box labelled 'same influence', and this response equalled 3. Finally, if they were 
uncertain about the relative relationship that each of the two factors had on the price of 
a share, they ticked the box on the far right of the line and this equalled 1. 
When conducting the parametric analysis of the mean, the analysis withdrew all the 
respondents who were uncertain. This gave the data properties more akin to interval 
data. The next step was to subtract one from all the remaining results (so 2 became 1). 
Therefore, if the mean of the results for a particular question was 2, the respondents 
indicated that they believed that the two factors presented had the same influence. If the 
mean was significantly greater than 2, it indicates that the respondent believes that the 
factor on the left is more important and if the result is less than 2, it indicates a high 
preference for the other factor. 
Part IV 
Results from Empirical Research 
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Hypothesis 1: Individual Investors believe that dividends affect the value 
of the share 
This hypothesis is tested in two parts (as discussed previously). First, question 1 
investigates the proposition that individual investors believe that dividends affect the 
value of a company's shares. Secondly, section four will investigate the influence that 
dividends have on share valuation. 
Results: Section 1 
The following table summarises the results for this question. 
Question 1: Dividends affect the value of a share. 
Strongly 
Agree 
34(19.7%)1 
Summary Statistics 
Agree 
118(68.2%) 
Uncertain 
12(6.9%) 
Disagree 
8(4.6%) 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 (.6%) 
Mean= 4.02 S.D. = 0.71 Std. Error= 0.05 Z score= 18.8 
Chi square statistic = 268.87 Skew= -1.18 Kurtosis = 5.87 
This is a very significant result. Over 87% of the respondents agreed with the 
proposition that dividends affect the value of a share. The evidence is important as the 
Z score indicates significance beyond the 0.01 level. Also, the high chi square statistic 
indicates that the responses were not random for this question and the measure of 
skewness indicates that the mode level of responses skew to the left (stronger level of 
agreement). 
This result is not surprising given that the majority of research available has been able 
to locate some correlation or relationship between a firm's dividend policy and its share 
price (such as Farrelly and Baker (1989) and Jose and Stevens (1989)). What is notable, 
is the extremely high level of support this proposition receives. It is evident that 
individual investors believe that dividends do affect the value of a share. 
1 Actual responses and (Proportion of respondents choosing this alternative). 
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Section 4: 
Section 4 investigates the relative influence that each of the five factors (described 
previously) has over the value of the share. As noted previously, the respondents who 
indicated that they were uncertain were included in the non-parametric analysis but 
were excluded from the parametric analysis. The summary of the results is as follows: 
Question 15: Comparing dividends to the Earnings Per Share. 
More Same less 
Influence Influence Influence Uncertain 
Dividends have D D D than EPS D 
46 45 59 23 
(26.6%) (26%) (34.1%) (13.3%) 
Summary Statistics 
Mean= 1.91 S.D. = 0.835 Std error = O. 07 Z score = 1.27 
Chi Square Statistic = 15.46 
There is slightly more support for earnings per share variable than for dividends. 
However, this result is not highly significant. These two factors appear to have a similar 
level of importance to individual investors (although the E.P.S. is slightly more 
important). The Chi Square analysis is significant at the 0.001 level, indicating that the 
responses were not random. 
Question 16: Comparing Company risk to imputation credits 
More Same less 
Influence Influence Influence Uncertain 
Company Risk has D D D than I. C's D 
100 11 21 41 
(57.8%) (6.4%) (12.1%) (23.7%) 
Summary Statistics 
Mean= 2.6 S.D. = 0.75 Std error= 0.07 Z score= 9.17 
Chi Square Statistic= 110.07 
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Significant support exists for the proposition that risk is more influential than 
imputation credits when individual investor's analyse companies. The Z score is 
significant at the 0.01 level as 58% of the respondents indicated that this factor was 
more influential. The very high Chi Square statistic indicates that the respondents' 
responses are not random. However, the number of individuals who are uncertain is 
moderately large. 
Question 17: Comparing the Price Earnings ratio to dividends. 
More Same less 
Influence Influence Influence Uncertain 
The P/E Ratio has D D D than dividends D 
72 40 25 36 
(41.6%) (23.1%) (14.5%) (20.8%) 
Summary Statistics 
Mean= 2.34 S.D. = 0.77 Std error= 0.07 Z score= 5.2 
Chi Square statistic = 28.5 
There is significant support for the proposition that the PIE ratio has more influence 
over the value of the shares than dividends as this result is significant at the 0.01 level. 
Again, a moderately high proportion of the respondents are uncertain about the 
relationship between the two variables but like the other questions, a very high Chi 
Square statistic resulted from this analysis. 
Question 18: Comparing the Earnings per Share to company risk. 
More Same less 
Influence Influence Influence Uncertain 
The EPS has D D D than risk D 
39 31 68 35 
(22.5%) (17.9%) (39.3%) (20.3%) 
Summary Statistics 
Mean= 1.79 S.D. = 0.86 Std error= 0.07 Z score= -2.9 
Chi Square Statistic= 19.48 
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Although there is a reasonable spread of responses (as also indicated by the slightly 
lower Chi Square statistic), there is significant support available (at the 0.01 level) for 
risk being a more important factor than EPS. 
Question 19: Comparing Imputation credits and dividends. 
More Same less 
Influence Influence Influence Uncertain 
Imputation Credits D have D D than dividends D 
51 40 42 40 
(29.5%) (23.1%) (24.3%) (23.1%) 
Summary Statistics 
Mean= 1.93 S.D. = 0.84 Std error= 0.07 Z score= -0.9 
Chi Square Statistic= 2.05 
Dividends and imputation credits have a similar influence over the value of the share, as 
the Z score obtained is not significant. Also, a significant proportion of the respondents 
are unsure about the relationship between these two factors. However, the statistic 
causing the greatest level of concern is the very low Chi Square score resulting from the 
analysis (p = 0.5616) which suggests that the responses for this question were either 
random answers, or indicated that a genuine indifference between dividends and 
imputation credits exists. 
Question 20: Comparing the Price Earnings Ratio to Imputation Credits. 
More Same less 
Influence Influence Influence Uncertain 
The P/E Ratio has D D D than I. C's D 
69 16 30 58 
(39.9%) (9.2%) (17.3%) (33.5%) 
Summary Statistics 
Mean= 2.34 S.D. = 0.87 Std error 0.08 Z score= 4.19 
Chi Square Statistic = 40.34 
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There is significant support for the proposition that the PIE ratio is more important than 
imputation credits when an individual investor analyses a company. Again a high 
proportion (approximately a third) of the respondents are unsure of the comparative 
influence of these two variables. The high Chi Square statistic indicates no particular 
problem with the pattern of responses. 
Question 21: Comparing the PIE ratio to company risk 
More Same less 
Influence Influence Influence Uncertain 
The P/E Ratio has D D D than risk D 
37 33 61 42 
(21.4%) (19.1%) (35.3%) (24.3%) 
Summary Statistics 
Mean= 1.82 S.D. = .85 Std error= .07 Z score -2.5 
Chi Square Statistic = 10.28 
Again a reasonable dispersion of results occurs, as the Chi Square statistic 1s 
significantly high enough to indicate that the responses are not random (p= 0.016). The 
respondents indicate that risk is a more influential factor than the PIE ratio when 
analysing shares. This result is significant at the 0.05 level (just misses out on the 0.01 
level). 
Question 22: Comparing dividends to company risk. 
More Same less 
Influence Influence Influence Uncertain 
Dividends have D D D than risk D 
24 27 87 35 
(13.9%) (15.6%) (50.3%) (20.2%) 
Summary Statistics 
Mean= 1.54 S.D. = .77 St error= .07 Z score = -6.9 
Chi square Statistic= 62.95 
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Significant support exists for the proposition that company risk is more influential than 
dividends. This result is significant at the 0.01 level and the Chi Square statistic is very 
high. 
Question 23: Comparing Imputation Credits to the Earnings Per Share factor. 
More Same less 
Influence Influence Influence Uncertain 
I. C's have D D D than EPS D 
28 24 62 59 
(16.2%) (13.9%) (35.8%) (34.1%) 
Summary Statistics 
Mean= 1.7 S.D. = .84 Std error= .08 Z score = -3.8 
Chi square statistic = 25.13 
The EPS factor has more influence than imputation credits. Although this result is 
significant at the 0.01 level, what is evident is the large number of respondents who are 
unsure about the relationship between the two variables. Again, the Chi Square statistic 
is high enough to indicate that the responses were not random. 
Summary 
In terms of the hypothesis being tested, the results follow the expected direction. 
Dividends were not a very highly rated factor in this particular analysis. This was not 
very surprising as several authors, such as Hickman and Petry (1990) stated that 
dividend based valuation models are not as accurate as earnings based models. 
However, this results contrasts Baker and Haslem (1974), and Campbell (1990) whom 
both reported that dividends rated very highly in both their studies. 
Therefore, when an individual investor is analysing shares: 
• Dividends are nearly as important as Earnings Per Share (the result showed that 
they had slightly less influence, but not a significant one). 
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• The PIE ratio is much more important than dividends. 
• Dividends have a very similar influence to imputation credits. Given that dividends 
must be paid for Imputation Credits to come into existence, this similarity in the 
ranking's may not be surprising (more respondents rated imputation credits as more 
important than dividends (9 more)). 
• Dividends are clearly subordinate to risk. Risk was significantly more influential 
than dividends to an individual investor. 
Overall Rankings. 
Somewhat surprisingly, risk was the most important variable in this analysis. This result 
is consistent with Good (1989) who reports that risk can be a very important factor, 
possibly overwhelming the significance of earnings and dividends. However, this result 
is inconsistent with several other studies of the information requirements of private 
investors. Hines (1981) states that the highest ranking factor in her analysis was the 
expected growth in earnings per share. In each question which analysed the relationship 
between risk and each of the other variables, risk received significantly more support 
than any other. 
The second most important factor appears to be the PIE ratio (although the available 
literature suggests it should have ranked first). This may highlight a difference between 
practitioners and private investors as Pari, Carvell and Sullivan (1989) report that this 
factor is very popular among security analysts, possibly indicating that private investors 
and practitioners apply very different techniques to analyse shares. It rates far higher 
than dividends or imputation credits and should rate ahead of earnings (as the PIE ratio 
incorporates E.P.S.) while only falling subordinate to Risk. 
The third most important factor is the EPS ratio, which ranks only marginally ahead of 
dividends, but significantly ahead of imputation credits. This factor should have 
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received a similar response to risk, but this result indicates that individual investors are 
relatively risk averse. 
Dividends and Imputation credits receive a relatively similar ranking2. Imputation 
credits rank slightly ahead of dividends in the direct comparison, but dividends receive 
a higher rating compared to company risk (14% compared to 12%) and EPS (27% 
compared to 16%) than imputation credits. 
One significant conclusion is that questions involving imputation credits receive a 
higher level of uncertain responses in this investigation (higher than any other factor). 
When this was analysed, the results indicated that the questions involving imputation 
credits had a significantly higher level (p = 0.001) of uncertainty than the other 
questions. 
Conclusion: 
Dividends do affect the value of the share. Question 1 of the survey proves that 
individual shareholders believe that dividends affect the value of a share. 
However, section four indicates that dividends have little influence over the value of a 
share, as was expected. 
When reviewing the comments that the respondents made about other factors which 
could influence share prices, the most apparent pattern is the high level of significance 
that macro-economic factors achieve compared to those which are firm specific. This 
question had two parts; the first allowed the respondent to summarise some factors 
which may influence the price of a share. Sixty Seven respondents (3 9%) outlined one 
or more influential factor. The next step was to indicate whether this factor(s) had more 
influence over the value of a share than dividends. Of the 55 respondents who answered 
this next section, 48 (87%) of them stated that these factors had more influence than 
2The relationship between Imputation Credits and Dividends (and the Investors age) is analysed further in Section 5. 
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dividends. This again highlights the minimal influence that dividends appear to have on 
share prices. 
The factors that the respondents indicated as important were: 
• the company's management (their proven record and reputation) was a very 
important factor (16 respondents), 
• the firm's earnings potential (16 respondents), 
• world markets (14 respondents), 
• the firm's industry ( 6 respondents), 
• interest rates (11 respondents), 
• the economy as a whole (16 respondents). 
Some of the comments were: 
Change in sector of economy which most affects shares, 
Political events, fluctuations in the commodities markets, 
Demand for the product, management and directors reputations, industrial relations, 
Competition, world markets, economy, directors pro.file, management, 
Market trend and perceived future profitability, 
Rumours, 
Future potential of company in relation to product being manufactured or sold, 
Risk, nta3, history, price, 
The respondents indicated that these factors were more important than dividends. This 
evidence is consistent with that previously found as it indicates that some private 
investors take a wide variety of information into account when they invest in 
companies, whereas others only rely on a limited range of information. 
Conclusion: The hypothesis is accepted as correct. Individual shareholders believe that 
dividends do influence the value of a share. However, dividends do not have a 
significant influence over the price of a share. 
3Net Tangible Assets. 
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Hypothesis 2: Private investors prefer dividend income to possible 
income from capital gains. 
Questions 2 and 3 investigate this hypothesis. Question 2 determines whether 
individuals would rather obtain income from capital gains or from dividend income. 
Question 3 investigates whether these two forms of income are viewed as being of the 
same risk. 
Preference for Income 
Question 2: It is better to generate income from capital gains on shares 
than by dividends. 
Strongly 
Agree 
26(15%) 
Summary Statistics 
Mean= 3.47 
Agree 
71(41%) 
S.D. = 1.051 
Chi Square Statistic= 67.66 
Uncertain 
37(21.4%) 
Disagree 
35(20.2%) 
Std error= 0.08 
Strongly 
Disagree 
4(2.3%) 
Z score= 5.8 
Skew= -0.34 Kurtosis= 2.2 
Approximately 56% of respondents agreed with this particular proposition. The Z score 
obtained is significant at the 0.01 level and the Chi Square statistic is highly significant, 
indicating a definite pattern in the responses. The measure of skew indicates that the 
mode level of responses is higher than the mean, indicating a high level of agreement. 
Although this result does not support the available evidence on individual investors' 
income preference (such as Shefrin and Statman (1984)), given the New Zealand 
environment the result is not surprising. Investors may prefer capital gains rather than 
dividends for a variety of reasons, such as; they could make larger absolute gains and 
the tax advantage of capital gains over dividends (unimputed) is an important factor, 
especially for those on the pension.4 Therefore, the majority of investors prefer to 
generate income from capital gains rather than dividends. 
4Especially those over 60 make up a large proportion of the respondents. 
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Relative Riskiness of Dividends and Capital Gains 
Question 3: Dividends are a less risky form of income than capital gains. 
Strongly 
Agree 
25(15%) 
Summary Statistics 
Agree 
98(56.6%) 
Uncertain 
37(21.4%) 
Disagree 
12(6.9%) 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1(.6%) 
Mean= 3.78 S.D. = 0.80 Std error= 0.06 Z score= 12.8 
Chi Square Statistic = 166.39 Skew= -.66 Kurtosis = 3.49 
The majority of the respondents believe that dividends are a safer form of income than 
capital gains (71.6% agreed with the proposition). The Z score is significant at the 0.01 
level and the Chi Square statistic is highly significant. The measure of skew result 
shows that the results contain a negative skew, as the mode level of responses is at a 
higher level of agreement than the mean indicates. 
This does not support Miller and Modigliani's view that dividend income and capital 
gains are perfect substitutes. The majority of respondents preferred to receive income 
from capital gains, but indicated that dividends were a safer form of income. This 
finding is consistent with Lintner's (1956) argument that dividends are a safer form of 
income than capital gains. 
Conclusion: Although investors believe that dividends are a safer form of income, they 
prefer to receive income from capital gains. Therefore the evidence available is 
insufficient to accept the second hypothesis. 
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Hypothesis 3: Private Investors believe that an increase in dividends 
signals an expected increase in company profits. 
Section 2 from the survey was used to analyse this hypothesis. Each question presented 
the respondent with a reason why dividends may increase and they could indicate 
whether they agreed or disagreed with the reason. The results are as follows: 
Question 4: A dividend increase occurs when managers predict that 
profits will increase. 
Strongly 
Agree 
20(11.6%) 
Summary Statistics 
Mean= 3.57 
Agree 
95(54.9%) 
S.D. = 0.97 
Chi Square Statistic= 146.28 
Uncertain 
23(13.3%) 
Disagree 
33(19.1%) 
Std error= 0.07 
Strongly 
Disagree 
2(1.2%) 
Z score= 7.77 
Skew= -0.63 Kurtosis = 2.49 
The respondents agree with the proposition that an expected increase in profits will 
cause a dividend increase (66.5% agreed). The Z score and Chi Square statistic are both 
highly significant. The high measure of skew indicates that the mode level of agreement 
was higher than the mean level of agreement. 
Question 5: A dividend increase is due to the company having excess 
cash. 
Strongly 
Agree 
11 (6.4%) 
Summary Statistics 
Mean= 3.49 
Agree 
91(52.6%) 
S.D. = 0.87 
Chi Square Statistic = 142. 75 
Uncertain 
41(23.7%) 
Disagree 
29(16.8%)1 
Std error = 0.07 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1(.6%) 
Z score= 7.31 
Skew= -0.54 Kurtosis = 2.49 
The respondents agree with the proposition that excess liquidity can cause a dividend 
increase. This obtains a similar level of agreement to the first factor, but slightly lower, 
as indicated by the lower mean and proportion of respondents agreeing with the 
proposition (59%). The resulting Z score is highly significant as is the Chi Square 
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statistic. Again the results contain a negative skew, indicating that a higher mode level 
of agreement. 
Question 6: A dividend increase is an attempt to increase the company's 
share price. 
Strongly 
Agree 
3(1.7%) 
Summary Statistics 
Mean= 2.86 
Agree 
47(26.2%) 
S.D. = 0.92 
Chi Square Statistic = 96. 7 4 
Uncertain 
51 (29.5%) 
Disagree 
67(38.7%) 
Std Error= 0.07 
Strongly 
Disagree 
5(2.9%) 
Z score= -2 
Skew= 0.18 Kurtosis = 2.00 
The responders disagree (slightly) with the proposition that a dividend increase is an 
attempt to increase the share price of a company (41.6% of the respondents disagreed 
while only 27.9% of the respondents agreed). Although many of the respondents were 
uncertain, the Z score is significant at the 5% level. The Chi Square Statistic is highly 
significant while the measure of skewness indicates that the results are slightly 
positively skewed. 
Question 7: A company will increase its dividend if it has no immediate 
investment prospects requiring cash. 
Strongly 
Agree 
4(2.3%) 
Summary Statistics 
Mean= 3.03 
Agree 
63(36.4%) 
S.D. = 0.95 
Chi Square Statistic= 97.06 
Uncertain 
45(26.1%) 
Disagree 
56(32.4) 
Std. Error= 0.07 
Strongly 
Disagree 
5(2.9%) 
Z score 0.4 
Skew= -0.09 Kurtosis = 1.88 
On the whole, the respondents are uncertain whether a company would increase its 
dividends if it had no immediate investment opportunities available. There is a 
reasonable spread of responses to the question (as 38.7% agreed with the proposition 
while 35.3% disagreed with it) and the Z score obtained is insignificant. The high Chi 
Square statistic indicates that the participants' responses indicated uncertainty, and their 
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responses were not random for this question. This is also consistent with the very low 
Skew results achieved. 
Question 8: The dividend is being increased to a level preferred by its 
shareholders. 
Strongly 
Agree 
3(1.7%) 
Summary Statistics 
Mean= 2.96 
Agree 
60(34.7%) 
S.D. = 0.93 
Uncertain 
39(22.5%) 
Disagree 
70(40.5%) 
Std error= 0.07 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1(.6%) 
Z score -0.5 
Chi Square Statistic= 116.91 Skew= 0.16 Kurtosis= 1.58 
Again a reasonable spread of responses exists for this question, as 36% of the 
respondents agreed with it and 41.5% disagreed with it (the Chi Squares statistic 
indicates that they are not random). The low skew test result indicates that the responses 
were symmetrical. The Z score obtained is insignificant. Therefore, the respondents are 
uncertain about the existence of a clientele motive for a dividend increase. 
Summary 
Of the variables analysed here, it appears that the most important reasons for a dividend 
increase is either because of an expected profit increase or a cash surplus. 
Of the other variables: the respondents did not agree with the proposition that managers' 
would increase the dividend in order to increase the share price. Finally they were 
uncertain as to whether a shortage of investment opportunities or an attempt to attract a 
new clientele of investors would cause dividends to increase. 
Therefore, the variables ranked as follows: 
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Table 4.1 Ranking of Dividend Increase Factors 
Factors likely to cause a dividend increase. Mean Rank 
Future predicted increase in profits 3.57 15 
Excess Cash 3.49 26 
No immediate investment prospects 3.03 3 
Level preferred by shareholders 2.96 4 
Attempt to increase share price 2.86 5 
The first two variables received very similar responses which were not significantly 
different from each other (using parametric statistical techniques). Therefore individual 
shareholders believe that the most likely reason for a dividend increase (out of the 
factors analysed) is expected increase in future profits or excess cash at the company. 
These results vary to those found by Partington (1989). The primary determinant of a 
dividend change in his study was profitability, but from this stage on, the results appear 
different. In his study, share price maintenance was the second highest ranking factor, 
while the liquidity position of the firm ranked after this (however the respondents still 
considered it important). Investor preferences rated highly (although it did not 
investigate the clientele argument) while the tax position of investors ranked lowest 
(considered unimportant). The Asset expansion (or investment prospects) ranked below 
investor preferences. 
Therefore, different perceptions exist between those who set dividends (managers) and 
those who receive dividends (investors) about the factors which influence. Most other 
research which focuses on dividend changes and its causes has used managerial 
survey's. This makes it difficult to compare these results to the available literature, as 
although they are analysing the same problem, they use different methods. 
5Significantly different (at the .001 level) from the last three factors, not the second factor (although the resulting Chi 
Square test for Goodness of Fit indicates that these two questions do receive a different distribution of answers. 
6Also rated as significantly different from the last three factors at the same level of significance. 
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The respondents were invited to make comments at the end of this section about any 
other variable which they believed may cause a dividend increase. Out of the 173 
responders, 54 (31 % ) made some comment about what they thought might be a major 
reason for a dividend increase. Of these, the majority (31 of the 54) made some 
comment that profitability was the key determinant of a dividend increase, whether it be 
past profits, present profits or future expected profits. The next most important factor, 
according to these respondents, was to increase shareholders' returns (an idea codified 
by Lintner). The rest of the comments dealt with a variety of ideas, from one off asset 
sales, to taxation reasons: 
Several of the comments were: 
Increased profits most important, 
Company is confident of increased profits, 
selling asset and giving one off dividend, 
better profits than previous years, 
rewarding shareholders for holding shares in the company, 
controlling shareholders requiring cash, 
Recognition of the need for shareholder loyalty, wish to maintain share price, 
The apparent trend in these responses is consistent with the other results. The majority 
of those respondents indicated that profitability was the major cause of a dividend 
increase. There was a fair mix of those respondents who thought that it was due to past 
profits, current profits and future profits. However, it does appear (in conjunction with 
the previous evidence) that individual investors believe that future profits are a key 
determinant when a company sets its dividends. 
Conclusion: Tentatively conclude that the hypothesis holds. Although the data does not 
indicate that an expected profit increase is the primary motivator of a dividend increase, 
it does indicate that this factor is a highly significant cause of a dividend increase. 
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Hypothesis 4: Private Investors believe a decrease in the dividend signals 
bad news (such as a drop in profits) for the company. 
Section 3 of the survey was used to investigate this hypothesis. Most of the questions in 
this section were mirror images (dividend increase became a decrease) of those 
questions asked in section 2. The results were as follows. 
Question 9: A dividend decrease is an attempt to attract different types of 
investors. 
Strongly 
Agree 
0(0%) 
Summary Statistics 
Mean= 2.21 
Agree 
14(8.1 %) 
S.D. = 0.76 
Chi Square Statistic = 132.23 
Uncertain 
30(17.3%) 
Disagree 
108(62.4%) 
Std error =0.06 
Strongly 
Disagree 
21(12.1%) 
Z score= -13.6 
Skew= 0.74 Kurtosis = 3.48 
The respondents rejected the proposition that a company would decrease its dividends 
to attract new investors. The majority of respondents disagreed with this statement 
(nearly 75%) and the Z score is highly significant (at the 1 % level). The Chi Square 
Statistic is also highly significant. Another important indicator is that none of the 
respondents strongly agree with this proposition while 21 strongly agreed with it. 
Finally, the results of the skew test shows that the mode level of responses skews to the 
right, indicating that the respondents had a significant level of disagreement with this 
proposition. 
Question 1 O: The company has increased investment opportunities for 
which it needs cash. 
Strongly 
Agree 
D 
4(2.3%) 
Summary Statistics 
Mean= 3.24 
Agree 
D 
84(48.6%) 
S.D. = 0.94 
Chi Square Statistic= 127.03 
Uncertain Disagree 
D D 
38(22%) 43(24.9%) 
Std error= 0.07 
Strongly 
Disagree 
D 
4(2.3%) 
Z score= 7.31 
Skew= -0.48 Kurtosis = 2.06 
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There is significant support for the proposition that a company would decrease its 
dividends if it had an investment opportunity requiring cash. The Z score is significant 
at the 1 % level and just over 50% of the respondents agree with this proposition. The 
Chi Square statistic is highly significant and the Skew test indicates that the responses 
skew to the left, towards agreeing with the proposition. 
Question 11: The company wishes to reduce debt by using cash from 
dividends. 
Strongly 
Agree 
7(4%) 
Summary Statistics 
Mean= 3.46 
Agree 
95(54.9%) 
S.D. = 0.83 
Chi Square Statistic = 96.48 
Uncertain 
41(23.7%) 
Disagree 
30(17.3%) 
Std error= 0.06 
Strongly 
Disagree 
0(0%) 
Z score = 7.34 
Skew= - 0.57 Kurtosis= 2.31 
The responses indicate that there is significant support for this proposition (at the 0.01 
level). Nearly 60% of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed with this proposition, 
and the Chi Square Statistic is highly significant. Another significant factor is that no 
respondent strongly disagreed to this proposition while 7 strongly agreed with it. The 
negative skew indicates that the respondents' mode level of agreement was higher than 
the mean level. 
Question 12: A dividend decrease occurs because management believes 
that profits will decrease. 
Strongly 
Agree 
9(5.2%) 
Summary Statistics 
Mean= 3.42 
Agree 
91(52.6%) 
S.D. = 0.88 
Chi Square Statistic= 143.85 
Uncertain 
38(22%) 
Disagree 
34(19.7) 
Std error= 0.07 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1(0.6%) 
Z score = 6.28 
Skew= -0.52 Kurtosis = 2.28 
The respondents agreed with the proposition that an expected profit decrease in the 
future can cause a dividend decrease. This result is significant at the 0.01 level as nearly 
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60% of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed with this proposition, while only 20% 
disagreed with it. The Chi Square statistic is highly significant and the measure of skew 
indicates that the responses are negatively skewed towards agreement. 
Question 13: A dividend decrease occurs because the company has 
insufficient cash to pay dividends. 
Strongly 
Agree 
20(11.6%) 
Summary Statistics 
Mean= 3.79 
Agree 
107(61.8%) 
S.D. = 0.75 
Chi Square Statistic= 130.05 
Uncertain 
33(19.1%) 
Disagree 
13(7.5%) 
Std error = O. 06 
Strongly 
Disagree 
0(0%) 
Z score= 14 
Skew= -0.69 Kurtosis = 2.41 
This factor gained the strongest support out of all the factors in this analysis. Over 74 % 
of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the proposition that insufficient 
liquidity can cause a dividend decrease. Particularly significant is that no respondents 
strongly disagreed with this proposition while 20 strongly agreed with it. The result 
obtained is highly significant (at the 0.01 level) and points to investors believing that a 
primary reason behind a dividend cut may be insufficient liquidity. The Chi Square 
statistic is highly significant as is the measure of skew indicates that the mode level of 
responses is higher than the mean. 
Question 14: Managers will decrease dividends to improve its situation in 
labour negotiations. 
Strongly 
Agree 
0(0%) 
Summary Statistics 
Mean= 2.34 
Agree 
9(5.2%) 
S.D. = 0.74 
Chi Square Statistic = 89.45 
Uncertain 
57(33%) 
Disagree 
84(48.6%) 
Std error= 0.06 
Strongly 
Disagree 
23(13.3%) 
Z score= -12 
Skew= 0.12 Kurtosis= 2.71 
The majority of the respondents (over 60%) disagreed or strongly disagreed with the 
proposition that managers' will decrease dividends to improve negotiations with labour. 
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The result is highly significant, as no respondent strongly agreed with this proposition 
while 23 strongly disagreed with it. The Chi Square statistic is highly significant while 
the measure of skew does not appear to be so. 
Summary 
The respondents believe that companies lower their dividends for a variety of reasons, 
such as an expected profit decrease, but believe it is more likely that they will decrease 
the dividend payout was because of insufficient liquidity. 
The factors ranked as follows: 
Table 4.2: Ranking of Dividend Decrease Factors 
Factor likely to cause a dividend decrease 
The company has insufficient cash available 
The company wishes to reduce debt 
Profits are expected to decrease 
Cash is needed for investing 
Improve negotiations with labour 
Attract different types of investors 
Mean Rank 
3.79 17 
3.46 28 
3.42 3 
3.24 4 
2.34 5 
2.21 6 
The factor which private investors believe is the most likely cause of a dividend 
decrease is a shortage of liquidity. The next two highest ranked factors are: that the 
company wishes to reduce debt or that profits should decrease in the future. The 
respondents disagreed with the propositions that a company wishing to alter its clientele 
or improve negotiations with labour would cause a dividend decrease. 
7Thls result received the highest ranking, and is significantly different from all other factors analysed in this section at the 
0.01 level. The Chi Square test of the Goodness of Fit indicates that the distribution of responses for this question are 
significantly different from the responses of the other questions. 
8This factor does not receive statistically significantly different support from the expectation that profits will drop. The Chi 
Square Goodness of Fit test reveals that these two questions receive a relatively similar distribution of responses. 
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When comparing these results to Partington (1989) they appear significantly different 
again, as the highest ranking factor in his study was a decrease in profits. However, the 
next factor (the reduction of debt) was only marginally important in Partington's study 
and ranked well behind profitability and liquidity and ahead of investments. These are 
the significant differences which occur with Partington's study. 
When reviewing the comments that the respondents made for this section, it appears 
that there is a wide distribution of opinion as to why dividends may decrease. 42 of the 
173 (24%) respondents made some comment about another reason why dividends may 
decrease. Of these: 
• profits were the major cause (17), 
• bad management caused it (7), 
• due to takeover defence (3), 
• 'good' reasons, such as capital expenditure (7). 
Some of the comments were: 
Bonus shares issued recently, 
Last ditch attempt to avoid insolvency, 
Profit growth will slow, 
Company wants a stronger bottom line in view of takeover, 
Major Capital &penditure, 
Profits already decreased, have already distributed previously set level of profits 
Decrease price and buy back own shares 
As interest rates fall, the need for high dividends diminishes 
Company run by liars, 
Incorrect belief by shareholders that dividends aren't important 
Decrease in profitability, 
Company has taken on too much debt 
Corporate strategy, directors spend too much on social occasion, 
Conclusion: Tentative rejection of the hypothesis. Private investors believe that the 
primary motive for a dividend cut is insufficient funds. This result is surprising as 
research shows that companies are very reluctant to cut dividends, even if they have 
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insufficient liquidity (as they will attempt to issue further capital or obtain more debt). 
Further evidence leading this hypothesis to be rejected is that the second highest 
ranking factor, is not bad news (reducing dividends to enable the company to reduce 
debt) while the profit motive ranked third. 
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Hypothesis 4a: There exists an inverse relationship between the reasons 
for a dividend increase and decrease. 
This hypothesis investigated the results of the four questions in section 2 having an 
inverse question (related to a dividend decrease) in section 3. The section compared the 
distribution of responses for each set of questions to see if the responses were the same. 
If the distributions are similar (or not statistically different), then it should indicate that 
individual investors' believe that each factor is just as likely to cause a dividend increase 
as a decrease. The results are as follows : 
Comparing Question 4 to question 12: 
Expected changes in profitability rated highly in both sections. It ranked first in section 
2 (although not significantly ahead of liquidity) and ranked third in section 3 (although 
not significantly different from second). 
Graph 4.1. Graphical comparison of responses for Question 4 and 12 
100 
90 Question 4 
""" 
80 
Cl) 70 
"" c ., 
60 ..., 
c 
0 
c. 
Cl) 50 ., 
a: 
..... 
0 40 
0 
z 30 
20 
10 
0 
5 4 3 2 
Possible Response 
When graphically comparing the results, a definite similarity between the responses 
exists, as the majority of the respondents agree with each of the separate propositions. 
The major difference occurring is that question 4 has a higher level of agreement and 
question 12 has a higher level of uncertainty. 
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Chi Square Test: Goodness of Fit 
Responses Agree Uncertain Disagree 
Answer 5 
Question 4 Responses 115 
Question 12 Responses 100 
Chi Square Statistic = 11. 73 9 
4 3 
23 
38 
2 
35 
35 
1 
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Although the distribution of answers has a very similar trend, the resulting Chi Square 
test of the Goodness of Fit indicates that the distribution of responses are different. 
According to this particular analysis private investors believe that an expected profit 
increase is slightly more likely to cause the dividends to increase than an expected 
profit decrease will cause dividends to decrease. This result is consistent with most 
empirical research showing that managers are more reluctant to cut dividends than they 
are to increase them. 
Comparing Question 5 to Question 13 
This question analyses whether the level of liquidity available (sufficient or 
insufficient) at a company affects the level of dividends in the same way. What is 
evident, from analysing hypotheses 3 and 4, is that liquidity is a very important factor. 
It was the second highest ranking factor causing a dividend increase9 and the highest 
ranking factor in terms of dividend decreases. However, when comparing a graphical 
representation of the two sets of data, what is evident is that respondents were more 
likely to agree to question 13 than to question 5. 
Chi Square Test: Goodness of Fit 
Responses Agree Uncertain Disagree 
Answer 5 4 3 2 1 
Question 5 Responses 112 41 30 
Question 13 Responses 127 33 13 
Chi Square Statistic= 16.516 
9Not significantly different from the highest ranking factor. 
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Graph 4.2 Graphical comparison of the responses to Questions' 5 and 13 
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The Chi square tests shows that a significant difference occurs in the distribution of 
responses between the two questions. Therefore, private investors believe that a 
company is more likely to decrease dividends when it has insufficient funds than it is to 
increase dividends when it has excess liquidity. This result makes intuitive sense as a 
firm with excess cash has more alternatives available (such as investing it, repaying 
debt etc) than a firm with insufficient funds, which must obtain further financing if it 
wishes to pay a dividend. 
Comparing Question 7 to Question 10 
These two questions investigate whether companies change their dividends due to the 
funding requirements for investments. These propositions received mediocre support in 
both the analyses of hypothesis 3 and 4. When investigating hypothesis 3, the 
respondents were very uncertain about its possibility. When analysing hypothesis 4, 
investors agreed with the proposition that a firm may reduce dividends to free up funds 
for investing. When compared to the other factors, it was not highly significant (ranking 
fourth out of six options available). When reviewing the graphical representation of the 
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results, it appears that the respondents were more likely to disagree with question 7 than 
question 10 (as was indicated by the mean-variance analysis) . 
Graph 4.3: Graphical representation of the responses to Question 7 and 1 O 
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Chi Square Test: Goodness of Fit 
ResQonses Agree Uncertain Disagree 
Answer 5 4 3 2 1 
Question 7 Responses 67 45 61 
Question 10 Responses 88 38 47 
Chi Square Statistic= 10.884 
The resulting Chi Square analysis revealed that distributions of the two questions are 
significantly different. Again, as with the other questions analysed, no equal 
relationship between dividend increases and decreases occurs. Individual investors 
believe that a company is more likely to reduce dividends to free up funds for investing 
rather than increase dividends due to a lack of investment opportunities. Again, not 
unlike the previous results, this makes intuitive sense, as a company with investments 
needing funds may cut dividends (see Ghosh and Woolridge (1988 and 1989)) whereas 
a firm with no investments available at the moment has a greater range of options 
available. 
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Comparing Question 8 to question 9 
Of the sets of questions analysed, these two questions represent the factor most equally 
likely to cause a dividend increase or a decrease. When reviewing the results of 
hypothesis 3 and 4, no significant relationship between the two is apparent. In section 2, 
there was no significant opinion regarding whether a furn would increase its dividend 
payout to attract new investors. However, in section three, the respondents disagreed 
with the proposition that the company would cut the dividends to attract investors . This 
result is even more apparent when reviewing the graphical results of the two questions. 
Chi Square Test: Goodness of Fit 
Responses 
Answer 
Question 8 Responses 
Question 9 Responses 
5 
Chi Square Statistic= 80.568 
Agree Uncertain Disagree 
63 
14 
4 3 
39 
30 
2 
71 
129 
1 
Graph 4.4: Comparison of the responses to Questions' 8 and 9 
120 
100 
Question 9 ~ 
.. 80 ... 
c: 
., 
"Cl 
c: 
0 Question 8 c. 
.. 60 
"" 
., 
" ... 0 
c:i 40 z 
. 20 
0 
5 4 3 2 
Possible Responses 
Dividend Policy and Private Shareholders 128 
The Chi square tests shows that no relationship exists between the distribution for 
question 8 and 9. Therefore, as with all the other questions, the distributions of answers 
received when stating the question in reverse, does not match. Private investors believe 
that a company may increase its dividend to attract a new form of clientele, and that 
dropping the dividend would not be successful at all. This may indicate that investors 
have a preference for a higher level of dividends as a drop in the dividends would not 
attract new investors. 
Summary 
When reversing the effect that a factor has on dividends, the respondents indicated that 
it has a different effect on dividend changes. There appears to be no linear relationship 
between a factor's influence on dividend increases and decreases. It is very difficult to 
directly compare these results to previous research as few have compared the influence 
that one factor can have on dividend increases and decreases. 
In summary, the results indicate that: 
a) An expected profit increase is more likely to cause dividends to increase than an 
expected profit decrease will cause dividends to decrease. This is consistent with 
Partington (1989, Pg 172) whose findings indicate that an increase in profits was 
slightly more likely to lead to a dividend increase than a profit decrease was likely to 
lead to a dividend decrease. 
b) Having insufficient liquidity is more likely to cause a dividend decrease than excess 
liquidity is likely to cause a dividend increase. Again this is consistent with available 
empirical literature, as a company can issue debt to maintain a dividend while a 
company with excess cash has more options available. However, when the new 
Companies Act comes into force, companies will have to meet a solvency test before 
paying a dividend. 
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c) A firm is more likely to cut dividends if it needs funds for investment than it is to 
increase dividends if it has no investment opportunities available. There is little 
literature available on this particular question. It appears more likely that a company 
would cut dividends if it needed the funds for an investment, as a company with 
insufficient investments has other options available. Examples are: repurchasing shares 
or investing in the short term money market 
d) Individual investors believe an increase in dividends is more likely to attract new 
investors than a decrease in dividends. This result is consistent with the 'Rightists' 
argument which states that investors prefer higher dividends. Therefore, a company 
cutting its dividend will not attract many new investors as investors, on aggregate, 
prefer to receive a higher dividend. This result is inconsistent with the Leftist view who 
favour setting dividends according to the preferences of rational profit maximising 
investors. 
Conclusion: Hypothesis 4a) is rejected. Private investors indicated that each of these 
factors affects dividend increases and decreases in different ways. There is significant 
enough evidence to reject the hypothesis. This result makes intuitive sense and supports 
some of the more generalised literature available; such as Managers' are far more 
reluctant to cut dividends than they are to increase them. 
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Hypothesis 5: There exists among New Zealand Private Shareholders an 
"age clientele", in which (in contrast to younger shareholders), older 
shareholders have a preference for shares paying a higher dividend. 
To investigate this hypothesis, the analysis compared the responses given to each 
relevant question (from section one and four of the survey) to the respondents age. This 
analysis excluded those respondents who did not indicate which age bracket they fell 
into. This left an effective sample of 169 respondents out of 173 to analyse this 
hypothesis. 
Section 1: 
This section investigated the individual investors' preferred income source and whether 
dividends represented a safer form of income than capital gains. 
In the original analysis, the respondents indicated that: 
1) Dividends do influence the value of a share. 
2) They prefer to obtain their income from capital gains rather than dividends. 
3) Dividends are a less risky form of income than capital gains. 
This section used a Least Squares regression methodology and Chi Square test to reveal 
whether there was any relationship between the respondent's age and their response. 
When applying the Least Squares methodology to Question one and three, the r squares 
obtained from the regression analyses were very low, indicating that this factor 
explained very little of the variance. 
The Chi Square test performed for question 1 indicated that some relationship existed 
between the two (p = 0.11), however a significant number of the cells had insufficient 
data points to make the analysis accurate. Attempts to refine the model by grouping 
similar categories together were not successful in improving the significance of the 
result. When testing Question 3, the initial analysis revealed that no significant 
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relationship existed. The following refinements were not able to induce a higher 
significance level, indicating again that no relationship occurred between an investor's 
age and the risk perceptions between dividend and capital gain income. 
Therefore, private investors have fairly constant perceptions (throughout the age 
groupings) of the riskiness of capital gain and dividend income, and whether dividends 
influence the value of a share. 
A similar result appeared in the original analysis of Question 2, as the Least Squares 
regression analysis revealed little correlation, and the original Chi Square analysis 
revealed little significant correlation (p= 0.44). The model was further refined by 
grouping the responses into three categories of 'agree', 'uncertain' and 'disagree', (also 
reducing the number of cells with insufficient data points). The analysis revealed that 
some relationship existed between an individual's age and income preference (p = 
0.096). 
The next step was to group together age classifications having relatively similar 
responses to each question. The following table summarises these results. 
Chi Square Analysis of the responses from Question two and Age. 
Age 
Above 51 
41 to 50 
Below 40 
Disagree 
28(28%) 
3(10%) 
7(18%) 
Chi Square Statistic= 9.719 
Significance p = 0.045436 
Responses 
Uncertain 
19(19%) 
4(14%) 
13(33%) 
Agree 
54(53%) 
22(76%) 
19(49%) 
Total 
101 
29 
39 
Degrees of Freedom = 4 
This analysis reveals that older investors (those over 51), compared to younger 
investors (those below 40), have a higher preference for dividend income than capital 
gains. They still have a high level of preference for capital gains as 53% of the 
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respondents still prefer to obtain their income from selling shares, where only 28% 
prefer to gain their income from dividends. A similar percentage of the younger 
investors preferred to obtain their income from capital gains ( 49% ), however a smaller 
percentage preferred dividend income (18%). The other major difference between these 
two groups is that younger investors are more likely to be uncertain or indifferent 
between their sources of income (33% of the respondents in the youngest age class 
compared to 19% of the older investors). 
A similar result occurs when analysing those who fall into the middle group (aged 41 to 
50). Like the oldest group of investors, their level of uncertainty or indifference is 
lower (14%) than that of younger investors, but they have a very low preference for 
dividend income (10%) and a relatively high preference for Capital Gains income 
(76%). 
Finally, a parametric Z score hypothesis test analysed these groupings. The respondents' 
answers had a value assigned to them, depending on whether they agreed with the 
proposition (5), were uncertain about the proposition (3) or disagreed with the 
proposition (1). The strength of their opinion is not being measured in this instance. The 
following table summarises these results. 
Z Score Analysis of the responses to Question 2 and Age. 
Age Grougs Mean Std. Dev'n1° Number in Groug 
Above 51 3.51 1.736 101 
41to50 4.31 1.339 29 
Below 40 3.62 1.532 39 
As indicated by the previous analysis, the group having the highest preference for 
dividend income are those investors aged above 51. However, this result is not 
statistically different from those aged below 40. The major cause of this is the high rate 
1 Dstandard Deviation. 
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of 'uncertain' responses by those participants aged below 40 (approximately a third of 
the respondents). The result obtained for those respondents aged between 41 and 50 is 
significantly different from both other groups of respondents, indicating a relatively 
high preference for capital gains, especially when compared to those investors aged 
over 51. 
Therefore, Investors aged between 0 and 40 have relatively homogeneous expectations 
regarding their income preference. A large proportion of these respondents were unsure 
as to what their preferred income source is, however, of those who know their 
preferences, few prefer dividend income over capital gains income. 
Investors aged between 41 and 50 age bracket, have lower levels of both uncertainty 
and dividend income preference. This group is highly focussed on Capital Gains. 
The final age classification (of those investors over 51) has a higher preference for 
dividend income when compared to the other groups, but a large proportion still 
preferred to obtain income from capital gains. 
This result is consistent with most currently available literature on the age clientele 
effect. Lease, Lewellen and Schlarbaum (1976) found that as the age of the investor 
increased the aggregate investor placed more emphasis on dividend income. Crocket 
and Friend (1988) viewed this preference as a rational one as this group is subject to 
lower taxes (this is not the case in the New Zealand). It appears that the transaction cost 
argument, and Shefrin and Statman's self control explanation may be more appropriate. 
Section 4: 
This section used the same methodology to analyse the results. Of this, five of the nine 
questions showed a significant correlation between the respondents' answers and their 
age. These questions were; 15, 16, 18, 19 and 21. 
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Question 15: Preference between Dividends and EPS. 
In the original analysis EPS was slightly more important than dividends to the 
respondents. When analysing the results for the comparison between the investor's age 
and these two factors, a relationship is evident. The following table shows the result of 
the Chi Square Analysis. 
Chi Square Analysis of the Preference for dividends or EPS vs Age. 
Responses 
Age 
Above 41 
Oto 40 
Uncertain EPS 
9(7%) 43(33%) 
10(26%) 15(38%) 
Chi Square Statistic 13.64 
Significance p = 0.0034 
Indifferent 
38(29%) 
9(23%) 
Dividends 
40(31 %) 
5(13%) 
Degrees of Freedom = 3 
Total 
130 
39 
Several conclusions can be made from this data: Firstly, younger investors (here 
classified as those below 40) have a higher level of uncertainty (7% of older investors 
compared to 26% of younger investors). Secondly, and more significantly, dividends 
were a much more important factor for older investors than for younger investors (31 % 
of older investors compared to 13% of younger investors). A higher proportion of older 
investors were indifferent between the two (29% compared to 23%) while a higher 
proportion of younger investors indicated that the EPS factor was more important than 
dividends (38% to 33%). 
These results, as with those found previously, are consistent with the Age Clientele 
Hypothesis. Older investors had a higher level of preference for dividends than younger 
investors. However, younger investors preferred Earnings Per Share, which has more 
influence than dividends over the value of a share.11 
11 As also indicated by the findings from hypothesis 1. 
Part IV: Results from Empirical Research 135 
Question 16: Preference between Company Risk and Imputation Credits 
When analysing hypothesis one, Company risk was the factor which the respondents 
rated as most important when analysing companies. The previous analysis located 
significantly stronger support for Company risk than imputation credits. The following 
table details these findings. 
Chi Square Analysis of the Preference for Company Risk vs Imputation Credits 
Responses 
Age Uncertain 1.c.12 Indifferent Risk Total 
Above 51 20(20%) 17(17%) 9(9%) 55(54%) 101 
31 to 50 9(21%) 2(5%) 0(0%) 32(74%) 39 
Below 30 10(40%) 2(8%) 1(4%) 12(48%) 25 
Chi Square Statistic 14.56 Degrees of Freedom= 6 
Significance p = 0.0239 
Again significant trends result from this analysis. The results are not as reliable as the 
previous results as several cells have expected values below five (3 of the 12). 
Again the most obvious conclusion is that younger investors have a higher level of 
uncertainty, as 40% of the investors aged below 30 were uncertain while approximately 
20% of those who were older than 31 were uncertain. The other tentative finding is that 
older investors have a higher preference for imputation credits. This finding is 
consistent with the previous results since older investors have a higher preference for 
dividends, they should have a higher preference for Imputation Credits.1 3 
121mputation credits (l.C.) 
131t may also indicate that dividends are more important to this group as they have a higher awareness of Imputation 
Credits, given that younger investors remain uncertain about them. 
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Question 18: Preference between EPS and Company Risk 
As previously mentioned, company risk was the factor which individual investors rated 
to be the most important factor. In the original analysis of this question, the combined 
respondents indicated that Risk was the more important factor. The resulting Chi 
Square Analysis (as shown in the following table) reveals a relationship between the 
investor's age and preferences. 
Chi Square Analysis of the Preference for EPS vs Company Risk 
Responses 
Age 
Above 31 
Below 30 
Uncertain 
25(17%) 
8(32%) 
Chi Square Statistic 16.265 
Significance p = 0.001 
Risk Indifferent 
62(43%) 20(14%) 
5(20%) 10(40%) 
EPS 
37(26%) 
2(8%) 
Degrees of Freedom = 3 
Total 
144 
25 
Consistent with the previous findings, younger investors (those aged below 30) are 
more uncertain than older investors (in this instance, those aged above 31 ). The other 
significant factor is that younger investors have a higher propensity to be indifferent 
between either risk or BPS, while older investors have a higher tendency to regard risk 
(and secondly BPS) as more important. 
Question 19: Preference for Imputation Credits vs. Dividends. 
In the original analysis, these two factors had statistically similar responses. The 
majority of the investors indicated that they were indifferent between these two factors 
when analysing companies. The following table highlights the results achieved when 
comparing the respondent's age to their responses for this question. 
Part IV: Results from Empirical Research 137 
Chi Square Analysis of the Preference for Imputation Credits vs Dividends 
Responses 
Age Uncertain dividend Indifferent l.C. Total 
Above 61 13(18%) 20(27%) 20(27%) 20(27%) 73 
51 to 60 4(14%) 6(22%) 4(14%) 14(50%) 28 
41 to 50 5(17%) 12(42%) 9(31%) 3(10%) 25 
Below40 16(41 %) 13(33%) 6(16%) 4(10%) 39 
Chi Square Statistic= 26.829 Degrees of Freedom = 9 
Significance p = 0.001 
Consistent with all previous results, the youngest class of investors had the highest level 
of uncertainty (41% compared to an average level of 17%). Apart from this, there is no 
constant trend in the responses. The oldest class of investors is remarkably consistent 
across the array of preferences in that they are indifferent between dividends and 
imputation credits when they analyse a company. The next oldest age classification 
(those aged between 51 and 60) has a higher preference for imputation credits than 
dividends, which may indicate that this group attempts to minimise taxable income 
rather than maximise the overall size of their income. The next two age classes (all 
those aged below 50) consider dividends more important than imputation credits. 
These results offer no significant evidence for or against the Age Clientele argument. 
The oldest class of investors still maintain a comparatively high preference for dividend 
income (despite the tax disadvantage for this income preference). The high level of 
preference for dividends recorded by the younger investors may be due to their not 
having a high level of understanding of imputation credits. 
Question 21: Preference for PIE Ratio vs Company Risk 
This was the last factor for which a relationship existed between the individual's age 
and pattern of response. As previously shown, Company Risk was the most important 
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factor out of these two to individual investors. The following table summarises the 
results of this analysis. 
Chi Square Analysis of the Preference for P/E ratio vs Company Risk 
Age Uncertain 
Above 51 20(20%) 
31to50 9(21%) 
Below 30 10(40%) 
Chi Square Statistic= 18.973 
Significance p = 0.0042 
Responses 
Risk Indifferent P/E Total 
37(37%) 15(15%) 29(29%) 10114 
20(47%) 9(21%) 5(12%) 43 
4(16%) 9(36%) 2(8%) 25 
Degrees of Freedom = 6 
As before, younger investors have a higher level of uncertainty than older investors. 
Apart from this conclusion, no consistent trend is apparent from these results. 
Older investors appear to either find risk or the PIE ratio the most important factor 
(with risk being the most significant factor) but they do not have a high level of 
indifference between the two. Investors aged between 31 and 50 find that risk is the 
more important factor while the youngest class of investors has a higher level of 
indifference between the two, given its high levels of uncertainty. 
Summary: 
Of this analysis, the most apparent result is that younger investors (most typically 
defined as those below 30) have a lower level of understanding regarding all these 
factors investigated here. If all the other sections used this methodology to test for a 
correlation between age and the pattern of responses, a similar trend of result would 
probably appear. This finding undermines the homogeneity of investors' assumption as 
younger investors are not as aware of the importance of these factors (as much as older 
investors). 
14oue to rounding, the percentages only add to 99%. 
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This makes intuitive sense, as younger investors may not have the same level of 
experience. However, when considering that younger investors have a higher preference 
for capital gains income, this is very surprising. As an investor must have a higher level 
of knowledge about the market to make capital gains rather than to receive an 
acceptable level of dividend income (given that most firms' attempt to maintain a stable 
dividend). Unfortunately there is little empirical literature available on this phenomenon 
in New Zealand. 
The other major consistent finding that this investigation has located is that older 
investors, in comparison to younger investors, have a higher preference for dividends 
than capital gains. This does not mean to say that older investors prefer to fund 
consumption from dividends but that a greater proportion of older investors prefer 
dividends. Questions 2, 15 (and possibly Question 19) provide evidence supporting this. 
What is more important, no significant evidence from this analysis can be used falsify 
this proposition. 
Another consistent finding was that older investors (in this case defined as those aged 
above 51) had a higher preference for Imputation Credits than younger investors. 
However a possible explanation for the disparity of preferences between these two 
groups is that this factor had a significantly lower level of understanding by younger 
investors. Therefore, if this group has a very low level of understanding regarding this 
factor, then they are not likely to regard it as an important factor. As Hamson and 
Ziegler (1990), and Wills (1991) report, certain classes of shareholders (they did not 
classify the groups) have not made full use of the credits. 
Conclusion: Tentative acceptance of the hypothesis. This analysis provides definite 
proof that older investors have a statistically higher preference for dividend income than 
younger investors. 
Summary and Conclusions 
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Summary and Conclusions 
This study investigated dividend policy in New Zealand and what it means to individual 
investors. Four specific areas were analysed (six hypotheses). They were: 
• Do investors believe that dividends influence the value of a share, 
• Whether an individual investor prefers to gain their income from shares or capital 
gams, 
• Do investors believe dividend changes can convey signals about a company and its 
performance, 
• Does an age clientele effect exists. 
To achieve the goal of this research, a mail survey of 280 individual shareholders in 
eight companies registered in New Zealand (35 per company) took place. The survey 
received a total of 173 useable replies and from this it was possible to investigate these 
proposed areas and learn about private shareholders. 
The results of the investigations into the six hypotheses were: 
Hypothesis 1: Accepted 
Private investors indicated that dividends do affect the value of a share but when the 
relative preference for the five factors (section four of the survey) was investigated, 
dividends did not rate very highly. 
Hypothesis 2: Rejected 
On aggregate, individual investors prefer to obtain income from capital gains on shares 
rather than dividends. However, they do not view capital gain income and dividends as 
perfect substitutes as dividends represented a safer form of income. 
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Hypothesis 3: Accepted 
An expected profit increase ranked as the highest indicator of a dividend increase. The 
other highly ranking factor was excess cash. Therefore, private investors believe that a 
dividend increase does signal positive news about a company's future. When 
investigating the open ended responses to this section, the respondents indicated that 
profits (past, present and future) are a key determinant of dividends. 
Hypothesis 4: Rejected 
Private Investors indicated that the highest ranked reason for a dividend cut is 
insufficient funds. A future expected decrease in profits rated highly and many 
respondents stated it was very important, but this factor rated similarly to the debt 
reduction motive (a motive which is not bad news). A popular theme when reviewing 
the open ended questions was that a dividend decrease results from bad management. 
Hypothesis 4a: Rejected 
Dividend decreases and increases appear to occur because of different reasons as each 
factor in the analysis had a different influence on dividend increases than on decreases. 
Hypothesis 5: Accepted 
This analysis provided evidence consistent with the age clientele hypothesis. As 
investors get older, they have a higher preference for dividend income. The reverse is 
true, as younger investors have a higher relative preference for capital gains than 
dividends. 
Other Conclusions: 
As a result of the study, numerous observations and conclusions were made about 
private investors. Where appropriate, these were tested to see whether a certain trend or 
trait was significant. These other findings are as follows: 
Summary and Conclusions 143 
a) The survey collected two forms of demographic information. The first piece of 
information concerned the age of the investors while the second concerned how large 
their portfolio was (number of companies). 
When analysing the age of private investors, it became apparent that the majority of 
private investors are older than 50. Over 60% of the respondents indicated that they 
were older than 51, 25% were aged between 31 to 50 while only 15% of the 
respondents were younger than 30. Previously, it has been very difficult to locate any 
information about the demographics of New Zealand investors. Since some information 
is now available about investors' age classifications and preferences, companies may be 
able to cater for these when setting dividend policy. 
When investigating the average size of each respondent's portfolio, it was apparent that 
a large proportion of shareholders (46%) own shares in between 1 and 5 companies. 
This indicates that most private investors have limited diversification against market 
risk. The mode level of companies owned shares in was 2 while the average level was 
about 8.1 Only 23% of the respondents indicated that they owned shares in more than 
11 companies. 
b) Private investors consider risk the most important factor when they are investigating 
companies. This factor ranked significantly ahead of the PIE ratio, and is very 
surprising given the majority of shareholders do not own a well diversified portfolio. 
c) Private investors have a low level of understanding regarding imputation credits 
(compared to other factors) which was significantly higher than all the other factors 
analysed in this research. However, older investors have a higher preference for 
dividends with full imputation credits (as evidenced by their comparatively high 
preference for this factor) and this group had a higher level of knowledge about this 
factor. 
1 Although as previously mentioned, this is heavily influenced by outliers. 
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d) Another variable that private investors find important is the quality and reputation of 
a company's management. Although this thesis did not include this in its analysis (as no 
available literature advocated this factor), the respondents indicated that this was 
important when they analysed companies. 
e) When analysing the open-ended results for the section dealing with dividend 
mcreases, a significant reason as to why managers' may increase dividends was to 
increase the actual return to the shareholder. Several respondents indicated that a 
dividend increase may be an attempt to increase the shareholders' return and reward 
them for owning shares in the company. 
f) A highly significant finding is that private investors appear to prefer higher dividends 
to lower dividends. The respondents indicated that decreasing dividends would not 
attract new investors whereas increasing the dividend might attract new investors. 
Therefore a company paying a higher dividend is more attractive than a company 
paying a lower dividend (given that the two companies are comparable). 
g) Younger investors (in this investigation, those aged below 30) do not have the same 
level of knowledge about the sharemarket as older investors. When comparing the 
responses between these two age groups, the most apparent trend was that younger 
investors had a significantly higher level of uncertainty than older investors. 
Optimal dividend Theory: 
One of the original goals of this research was to investigate the three main optimal 
dividend policies proposed and to determine whether the evidence collected would 
support any of the three theories. Although this research did not test these three theories 
directly (apart from the first section), the evidence provided throughout the analysis 
revealed information about the preferences of private investors and its relationship to 
optimal dividend policy. The evidence gathered by this research is most consistent with 
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the Traditional Rightists theory of dividend policy. Their argument that higher 
dividends are preferred by investors gains significant evidence. Such as: 
• Investors indicated that they prefer higher dividends to lower dividends, which is 
consistent with this theory. 
• Private investors indicated that dividends affect the value of a share. This is 
inconsistent with Miller and Modigliani's (1961) argument that dividend policy does 
not affect a firm's value. 
• Dividends and capital gains are not substitutes for each other as the respondents 
believed that dividends and capital gains were not of the same risk class. This is 
inconsistent with Miller and Modigliani's argument that capital gains and dividends 
are substitutes. 
• Despite the tax disadvantage of preferring dividends, older investors have a 
relatively high preference for dividend income. This is inconsistent with the tax 
based clientele argument which argues setting dividend policy according to the tax 
laws. 
• Private investors believe that managers do smooth dividends to a certain extent as 
several respondents indicated that past, present and future profits are taken into 
account when setting dividends. 
• Several respondents indicated that part of the reason for a dividend increase is to 
reward investors. This is consistent with Lintner (1956, Pg 100) who commented 
that "Most officers and directors regarded their stockholders as having a 
proprietary interest in earnings, and many urged the stockholders special interest in 
getting earnings in dividends". 
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Limitations of the study 
A very important step when conducting research of this type is to recognise the 
limitations involved. Identification of these will help future research overcome these 
problems and produce more accurate and reliable results. Several limitations existed in 
this research: 
a) The first problem was the shortage of available literature to gain guidance from. This 
area of finance has attracted little attention from researchers and this left little for this 
research to follow on from. The problem was most severe when designing the survey, 
as little literature uses surveys' to research individual shareholders. Therefore, the 
questionnaire design used in the survey is exploratory. 
b) The Company Register at Registry Managers used to obtain the listing of potential 
respondents for the survey was not accurate for some companies. This may be due to 
poor recording keeping by those involved or individual investors not informing the 
Register when their addresses changed. This led to some surveys being returned 
unanswered as the participant no longer lived at the address supplied.2 
c) Another significant limitation of using surveys to gain information is the problem of 
non-response bias. When analysing this, the first step was to compare the demographics 
of responders and non responders. However, this survey only collected two forms of 
demographic data and the analysis of early and late responders revealed no significant 
differences between the two. 
The next step was to analyse the differences in responses between these two groups. 
This analysis indicated that for several of the questions, later respondents had a higher 
level of uncertainty than earlier respondents. This problem did not appear to be 
significant due to the high response rate the survey achieved. 
2The worst example of this was that one survey was returned with the comment that the respondent had not lived at that 
address for eight years. 
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d) Another limitation of the study was the method used to deal with partial non-
response (where a respondent left out a question). The methodology used to overcome 
this problem did not follow the format suggested by the available literature (mainly due 
to the ordinal qualities that the data displays). Fortunately there were not many 
instances where this occurred so it should not be a major problem. 
e) A further limitation with this survey (which is endemic to all surveys) is that the 
questions in the survey may have meant different things to each respondent. The survey 
was extensively pre-tested, so this should not have been a significant problem. 
f) The questionnaire did not include the question comparing Earnings Per Share to the 
Price Earnings ratio. This should not present a major problem as the respondents 
logically should prefer the PIE ratio as it already includes the E.P.S. figure in its 
calculation. 
g) The statistical methodologies employed by this research may not be appropriate. Due 
to survey design (using Likert Scale questions) a limited array of statistical 
methodologies are available to analyse the data. Although many previous studies use 
parametric statistics to analyse the data, this may not be allowable, as statistical 
literature doubts whether data obtained from a Likert scale has interval qualities. 
However, the analysis only used parametric statistics where they appeared applicable. 
h) When investigating the clientele hypothesis, it became very apparent that a very 
small number of the respondents were 'younger' (aged below 30). This result was not 
due to a response bias but it made the analysis of the age clientele effect unreliable due 
to the small number of young investors. If this problem is to be overcome by future 
research, a larger number of young investors will have to be included in the sample. 
Hopefully these limitations are not significant enough to invalidate the results of this 
research as every effort was made to minimise these problems. 
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Further Research: 
In order to overcome the limitations of this research and to add further evidence to that 
found here, further research should be conducted. Some of the elements which would 
improve this research are: 
Due to small number of young investors responding to the survey, increasing the size of 
the survey is a necessary option. This will have the advantage of increasing the number 
of young investors who respond to the survey, enabling a more accurate assessment of 
the clientele effect to take place. 
Some attempt should be made to use a ranking test for the information signalling 
hypothesis. Although this methodology has drawbacks it helps determine which factors 
are most likely to lead to a dividend change. 
Several new apparently influential factors have become known, especially the quality of 
management variable. 
The relative information requirements of investors by age. This research has been able 
to determine that younger investors are more uncertain than older investors and that 
they do have different preferences to older investors. Therefore, these two sections of 
private investors must obtain their information in different ways. 
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Appendix 1: 
The Survey Questionnaire 
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A) Dividends affect the value of a share. 
Strongly 
Agree 
D 
Uncertain 
D 
Disagree 
D 
8) Income from dividends is better than from selling shares. 
Strongly 
Agree 
D 
Uncertain 
D 
Disagree 
D 
C) Dividends are a less risky form of income than capital gains. 
Strongly 
Agree 
D 
Uncertain 
D 
A) Managers predict that profits will increase. 
Strongly 
Agree Agree Uncertain 
D D D 
8) The company has excess cash. 
Strongly 
Agree Agree Uncertain 
D D D 
Disagree 
D 
Disagree 
D 
Disagree 
D 
C) It is an attempt to increase the company's share price. 
Strongly 
Agree 
D 
Uncertain 
D 
Disagree 
D 
Strongly 
Disagree 
D 
Strongly 
Disagree 
D 
Strongly 
Disagree 
D 
Strongly 
Disagree 
D 
Strongly 
Disagree 
D 
Strongly 
Disagree 
D 
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Section 2: continued: 
When a company increases its dividends, it means that ( V') 
D) The company has no immediate investment prospects it needs cash for. 
Strongly 
Agree 
D 
Uncertain 
D 
Disagree 
D 
Strongly 
Disagree 
D 
E) The dividend is being increased to a level preferred by its shareholders. 
Strongly 
Agree 
D 
Uncertain 
D 
Disagree 
D 
Strongly 
Disagree 
D 
160 
Are there any other reasons for an increase in dividends? Please state. ___ _ 
A) Management is trying to attract different types of investors. 
Strongly 
Agree 
D 
Uncertain 
D 
Disagree 
D 
Strongly 
Disagree 
D 
8) The company has increased investment opportunities for which it needs cash. 
Strongly 
Agree 
D 
Uncertain 
D 
Disagree 
D 
Strongly 
Disagree 
D 
C) The company wishes to reduce debt using cash from dividends. 
Strongly 
Agree 
D 
Uncertain 
D 
D) Management believes that profits will decrease. 
Strongly 
Agree 
D 
Uncertain 
D 
Disagree 
D 
Disagree 
D 
Strongly 
Disagree 
D 
Strongly 
Disagree 
D 
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E) The company has insufficient cash to pay dividends. 
Strongly 
Agree 
D 
Uncertain 
D 
Disagree 
D 
Strongly 
Disagree 
D 
F) The company is trying to improve its situation in labour negotiations. 
Strongly 
Agree 
D 
Uncertain 
D 
Disagree 
D 
Strongly 
Disagree 
D 
161 
Are there any other reasons for a decrease in dividends? Please state. ___ _ 
Definitions: 
Dividends = The dividend paid by each firm. 
EPS = The Earnings Per Share. Equals the company's profit divided by the number 
of shares issued. 
PIE Ratio = The Price to Earnings ratio. Equals the Price of the share divided by its 
earnings (per share). 
Risk = How risky the company is seen to be, for example: how much debt it holds, 
how much its income fluctuates, or the likelihood that it will go out of business. 
Imputation Credits= whether the companies dividends are fully imputed. 
Here are two columns of factors which can be involved with valuing shares. In your 
own opinion (when valuing shares for yourself), does the factor in column (X) have 
more influence, the same influence or less influence over the price of the share 
than the factor in column Y (·I'). 
Column Column More Same less 
6 y: Influence Influence Influence Uncertain 
A) Dividends EPS D D D D 
B) Company Risk Imputation Credits D D D D 
C) P/E Ratio Dividends D D D D 
D) EPS Company Risk D D D D 
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Column Column More Same less 
~ :i Influence Influence Influence Uncertain 
E) Imputation Credits Dividends D D D 
F) P/E Ratio Imputation Credits D D D 
G) P/E Ratio Company risk D D D 
H) Dividends Company risk D D D 
I) Imputation Credits EPS D D D 
Are there any other factors which have an effect on the value of shares? Please 
state 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Do they have more influence than dividends over the value of the 
share? 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Approximately how many companies do you own shares in presently? __ 
If zero (0), have you ever owned shares previously ( v") Yes D No D 
What age Category do you fit into ? (v") 
21 - 30 31 - 40 41 - 50 51 - 60 
D D D D 
Thank you for your assistance in completing this questionnaire. 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
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The follow up letters 
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«Name» 
«Address1 » 
«Address2» 
«Address3» 
Dear Shareholder 
Dividend Policy: Is it important? 
164 
As part of my university studies, I am researching New Zealand shareholders, 
regarding what they think dividends say about a company and how important 
dividends are to them. 
Your Participation in this study would be greatly appreciated. 
You and all the other respondents have been chosen at random from the 
company register so that a cross section of private investors in New Zealand 
has been chosen. While aggregate results will be distributed, your personal 
opinions and views will remain confidential. 
Could you please help me by completing a series of approximately 25 
questions. This, I hope, should take you no longer than 10 minutes. Even if you 
own shares but are not personally responsible for managing your share 
portfolio, your views and opinions are important to my research so I hope that 
you can complete the survey. 
Thank you very much for you time. 
Yours sincerely. 
Craig Palmer 
Appendices 
18 August 1993 
«Name» 
«Address 1 » 
«Address2» 
«Address3» 
Dear Shareholder, 
165 
Recently you were sent a copy of my survey on Dividend Policy and Share 
Valuation. I am writing to you now to reaffirm my interest in receiving a reply 
from you. 
The New Zealand Sharemarket has been particularly busy recently, much of 
which is due to private shareholders (such as yourselves) trading more actively. 
Your reply can greatly assist in making my results more relevant. 
Could you please complete the questionnaire, even if you are unsure of the 
answers, as your responses are very important to me. 
If you are unable to locate your copy of the survey, I will send out an extra copy 
to you next week to enable you to complete it - I hope that you can. 
Yours sincerely 
Craig Palmer 
Dividend Policy and Private Shareholders 
27 August 1993 
«Name» 
«Address1 » 
«Address2» 
«Address3» 
Dear Shareholder, 
166 
Recently you were sent a copy of my survey on Dividend Policy and Share 
Valuation. I am writing to you in the hope that you will able to complete it and 
return it to me. In case you have mislaid the original copy of the survey, I have 
enclosed a further copy and a prepaid reply envelope so that you will be able to 
reply. 
Could you please complete the questionnaire, even if you are unsure of the 
answers. Your responses are very important to me, as the higher the response 
rate which I get (now just under 50%), the more reliable will be my results. 
If you were wondering, the number on the back of the questionnaire is intended 
to identify each respondent, but only so that I can cross your name off the list if 
a reply is received when I send out further follow up letters. 
Thank you very much for your participation. 
Yours sincerely 
Craig Palmer 
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Appendix 3: 
Response To Each Question 
Responses 
Key 
5 Strongly Agree 
4 Agree 
3 Uncertain 
2 Disagree 
1 Strong Disagree 
Question 1 
4 3 2 1 
118 12 8 1 
5 4 3 2 
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Question 2 
4 3 2 1 
71 37 35 4 
80 
5 4 3 2 
Question 3 
4 3 2 1 
98 37 12 1 
5 4 3 2 
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Question 4 
I 5 4 3 2 1 20 95 23 33 2 
5 4 3 2 
Question 5 
4 3 2 1 
91 41 29 1 
5 4 3 2 
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Question 6 
I : 4 2 1 3 51 47 67 5 
5 4 3 2 
Question 7 
I : 4 1 3 2 63 45 5 56 
5 4 3 2 
Appendices 171 
Question 8 
I 5 4 3 2 1 3 60 39 70 1 
5 4 3 2 
Question 9 
I ~ 4 3 2 1 14 30 108 21 
5 4 3 2 
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Question 10 
I : 4 3 2 1 84 38 43 4 
5 4 3 2 
Question 11 
I ~ 4 3 2 1 95 41 30 0 
5 4 3 2 
Appendices 173 
Question 12 
I 5 4 3 2 1 9 91 38 34 1 
5 4 3 2 
Question 13 
4 3 2 1 
107 33 13 0 
120 
5 4 3 2 
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Question 14 
I ~ 4 2 1 3 57 84 23 9 
90 
80 
70 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
5 4 3 2 
Key 
4 Factor A 
3 Indifferent 
2 Factor B 
1 Uncertain 
Question 15 
3 2 1 
45 59 23 
4 3 2 
Appendices 175 
Question 16 
4 3 2 1 
100 11 21 41 
4 3 2 
Question 17 
3 2 1 
40 25 36 
4 3 2 
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Question 18 
3 2 1 
34 68 35 
4 3 2 
Question 19 
3 2 1 
40 42 40 
60 
4 3 2 
Appendices 177 
Question 20 
I 4 3 2 1 69 16 30 58 
4 3 2 
Question 21 
3 2 1 
33 61 42 
70 
4 3 2 
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Question 22 
3 2 1 
27 87 35 
4 3 2 
Question 23 
3 2 1 
24 62 59 
4 3 2 
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